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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to reconsider what has
historically been called "Romantic” in American education.
What I discovered was the ubiquity of organicism— an
organicism which, when applied to education, promises to
heal divisions with connection and integration.

A reading

of Romanticism as organicism is a traditional
interpretation which fails to acknowledge the revisionist
work of critics like de Man, Hartman, Bloom, and McFarland,
who regard the Romantic recognition of language and selfconsciousness as providing alienation, not unity.

However,

education continues to regard the Romantics as organicists
and to provide organic remedies, such as the organic
reforms proposed in the work of John Dewey, Harold Rugg,
Caroline Pratt, Paul Goodman,
Willinsky.

Ivan Illich, and John

These educators adopt mechanistic metaphors in

describing traditions they wish to see replaced and organic
metaphors in urging their proposals for integration and
connection.

In chapters four and five, I focus on organic

theories of writing and reading suggested by Dewey's
aesthetics and by Willinsky's theories of language arts.

viii

Emerson's influence on American education is
extensive, but educators read him in a traditional w a y — as
an organicist— disregarding his recognition of language and
self-consciousness as creating the division between
humankind and n a t u r e .

This organicist interpretation of

Emerson has especially dominated the process rhetoric
endorsed by Willinsky.

Regarding language and the

imagination as implements of mediation, both Dewey and
Willinsky assume a symbolic theory of language, and they
arg u e , metaphysically, that reading and writing result in
communication and shared meaning.

Assuming an autonomous,

centered subject, they see writing and reading as vehicles
for connecting self with self and self with a community of
others.
In chapter five I propose an interpretive model
inspired by Shoshana Felman's reading of Lacan, one
recognizing an asymmetrical triadic configuration of
student, teacher, and Otherness— a triad which questions
the mirrored narcissism of the organic model by suggesting
the introduction of the unconscious as a source of new
knowledge, a model which seeks the return not of a
confirming sameness but of difference.

In straining to

effect connection, organicist educators have ignored
Otherness,

language,

and difference.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Romantic poets and thinkers of the nineteenth
century have been misread by American educators.

They have

been misread as organicists, pantheists, primi t i v i s t s ,
idealists, and solipsists while their most significant
contribution— their recognition of the discontinuity
between language and nature— has been overlooked.

That

this contribution has been neglected, that they have been
defined for us as nature worshipers and organicists,

and

that these misreadings have been translated into an
educational philosophy called "Romantic" may be attributed
to the ingenuous readings of educators; h o w e v e r , a more
likely basis for this common interpretation is the work of
literary historians of Romanticism and New Critical
theorists whose interpretations eventually reified the
critical canon that defined "Romanticism" for generations
of Americans.
As a consequence of these interpretations, educators
have read the Romantics primarily as wholistic reconcilers
of fissures between subject and object, as synthesizers who
imaginatively heal ruptu r e s .

Commanding Romantic critics

such as Northrop Frye, Rene Wellek, and M. H. Abrams
canonized such interpretations.

Compounding the problem of

these influential historians who established the Romantics
as "nature poets" and organicists was the approach of New
Critics1 like T. S. Eliot, who attacked what he considered
the excessive inwardness and subjectivity of the Romantics.
In arguing that these critics have laid the foundation
for this historical misreading, I am not suggesting an
ideological conspiracy,

for I plan to acknowledge Romantic

texts that prompted these interpretations.

What I do argue

is that the Romantics longed for a symbolic language that
could represent union but that they expressed allegorically
the reality of their fragmentation.

In one voice-— the

dominant voice— the Romantics recognized their own selfconsciousness and temporal instability and contrasted it
with the superiority of natu r e 's unselfconsciousness and
permanence.

This voice of recognition, what Paul de Man

calls "this painful knowledge," is, in the words of de Man,
the "true voice" of Romanticism (RT 191).

In establishing

organic interpretations, readers have ignored this voice.
In another voice— the voice that supports organic
readings-— the Romantics express desire and longing in
symbolic language that imaginatively attempts to remove the
burden of consciousness.

De Man identifies the conflict as

one between allegorical language, a "self seen in its
authentically temporal predicament," and symbolic language,
"a defensive strategy that tries to hide from this negative
self-knowledge"

(RT 191).

The Romantics, according to de

Man, engage in "tenacious self-mystification"

(RT 191) when

they, as Coleridge does, endorse symbol over allegory.
De Man says the
historical scheme . . . differs entirely from the
customary picture.
The dialectical relationship
between subject and object is no longer the
central statement of romantic thou g h t , but this
dialectic is now located entirely in the temporal
relationships that exist within a system of
allegorical signs.
(RT 191)
The historians of Romanticism and the New Criticism
read only the Romantics' wish to deny time, read only their
nostalgia for the natural obj e c t , read,

in other w o r d s ,

only their defensive strategies and ignore their failure to
achieve this identification.2

When their imagination

allows the Romantics what de Man calls "tranqui11ity" and
Harold Bloom calls "reciprocity," these imaginative
identifications are even then "far from having been
definitively reconquered"; they are,
terms "moments of peace"

instead, what de Man

(IS 15) and what Bloom

characterizes as coming "only in flashes"
In their eagerness for synthesis,

(9).

"Romantic" educators

have chosen to respond to the flashes while disregarding
what Thomas McFarland says "saturates" Romanticism:
longing,

incompleteness, fragmentation, ruin (7).

Any

Romantic impulse toward coincidence— a self-identifying or
self-seeking union with nature— de Man has seen as "only
one passing moment" and "a negative moment at that, since
it represents a temptation that has to be overcome";
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it does not, de Man reasons,
experience"

(RT 188).

"designate the main romantic

It is, however, these "flashes" and

"passing moments" that educators and their critics have
characterized as constitutive of "Romanticism" in
education.
In short, "organic" Romanticism is the Romanticism of
education.

I conten d , first, that organicism should not be

termed "Romantic" by those who wish to draw parallels
between organic reform measures and the Romantic poets and
thinkers of the nineteenth century (doing so reduces the
Romantics to naive nature worshipers)

and, second, that the

organic model neglects the complexities of cognitive
relationships between student, tea c h e r , and knowledge.
Instead,

I will argue that the desire for organic unity is

an indulgence in a kind of mystif ication and that a more
appropriate model would recognize not organic identity but
otherness and would acknowledge what the Romantics
appreciated:

the instability of language.

In succeeding chapters I hope to demonstrate the
tenacity of the organic model by delineating the history of
an idea as it has appeared in the work of six educators—
Progressives John Dewey, Harold Rugg, Caroline P r a t t ;
deschooling philosophers Paul Goodman and Ivan Illich; and
writing and reading theorist John Willinsky.

I have made

no effort at equal treatment, for I consider Dewey and
Willinsky central to my criticism of "Romantic" organicism
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and my own proposal to establish an alternative
interpretive model.

Running parallel to the organic

philosophies of these educators is a century of debate over
organic-mechanistic concepts of writing— -a debate that
mirrors the reform rhetoric of the six educators I've named
and one whose organic components supposedly derive from
Deweyan and Romantic expressionism.
John Willinsky's endorsement of expressionistic
writing and reader-response reading is but the latest
effort at establishing writing and reading as organic
processes that call for a student's "sovereign,
consciousness at the center"
"natural" acts.

self-aware

(Crowley 32) of these

Willinsky has invoked the "earlier voices"

of the Romantics— especially the British Romantics— and has
called for their "music" to be "replayed and reworked"
188).

(NL

But is Willinsky's inspiration "Romantic," and are

his attempts at synthesis sound?
Although he credits the muses of Romanticism with his
adoption of organic theories of writing (a "connecting," an
"integrating" of "the learner into what is to be learned")
(NL 56) and reading (an "organic relationship" between
readers and texts)

(NL 70), I suggest that his relationship

to the Romantics does not spring from what de Man calls the
"main romantic experience."
In these early chapters,

I plan both to establish the

durability of organic educational philosophy and to
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question its application to perceived dualisms in American
education; in the final chapter I will focus specifically
on Willinsky's endorsement of the "organic relationship"
between readers and texts that he wishes to see established
in the teaching of literature.

As an alternative to his

reader-response and organic models of interpretation, I
will offer a Lacanian model suggested by the work of
Shoshana Felman— a model which breaks up the dualism
Willinsky and other organicists wish to avoid, a strategy
correlating reader, teacher,

and Other in triadic dialogue.

Felman reminds us that learning is more than self
reflection,

for

self-reflection is always a mirror reflection,
that is, the illusory functioning, of reasoning
by the illusory principle of symmetry between
self and self as well as between self and o t h e r ;
a symmetry that subsumes all difference within a
delusion of a unified and homogenous individual
identity.
(JL 61)
The wholeness and unity offered by dialogical pedagogical
models, Felman suggests, is "illusory," a fiction.

A self

grounding system accounts for itself by means of self
reflection and smooths out differences to offer the
"delusion" of "a unified" identity, but Felman's
introduction of the Other disrupts this model and moves
pedagogy from information to an asymmetrical reflexivity.
This radical alteration of the classroom dyad results from
Felman's removal of the teacher as the "subject presumed to
know"

(JL 84) and her introduction of thirdness,

that is,

her introduction of the Other as a position from which both
student and teacher hear their own unconscious discourse:
The unconscious is a discourse that is
other, or ex-centric, to the discourse of a s e l f .
It is in effect a discourse that is other to
itself, not in possession of itself; a discourse
that no consciousness can master and that no
speaking subject can assume or own.
The unconscious is a discourse that is
radically intersubiective. Since it is a
discourse that no consciousness can own, the only
way a consciousness can hear it is as coming from
the Other [original emphasis] . . . .
(JL 123)
With the introduction of Otherness in high school and
university classrooms, the teaching of literature will not
be synonymous with the transmission of information, that
is, with students ’ memorizing factual information about the
poetry, novels,

and short stories they read— -information

concerning the biography of an author, the meaning of a
work, or the intention of an author— information which the
teacher transfers to the student who responds to an
anticipated question with an answer which is also expec t e d .
Education should be more than the transmission of
information; indeed,

if pedagogy were defined as the

transmission of information, then knowledge might be
thought of as something that could be exhausted.
kind of traditional,

In the

symmetrical dialogue defined by many

educators as the organic union of questioning teacher and
responding student, both student and teacher tell each
other what they already know, transmitting information in a
perpetual and controlled cycle.

However, because this

cycle offers the opportunity for both student and teacher
to express only the knowledge they already possess and
offers no avenue for accessing a "discourse that is other"
to "the discourse of a self," then the traditional
dialogical cycle offers only an unfolding of what is
already t h e r e , of what is already k n o w n .
With the introduction of Otherness,

students would

also move beyond the subjective responses to literature
which Willinsky's pedagogy prescribes.

Although Willinsky

believes literature to be more than the dispensing of
information, he does not move beyond a call for self
reflection (or perhaps self-reflection somehow merging with
the myriad interpretations of a community of read e r s ) .
His theory, then, does not recognize the Otherness outside
the symmetry of self and self or self and o t h e r s .
But Felman says that there is a discourse outside our
conscious knowledge, a discourse "not in possession of
itself," one that "no subj ect can m a s t e r ."

While

organicist educators call for symmetry and a smo o t h ,
integrated unity of self and o t h e r , Felman's pedagogy calls
on difference, on the introduction of that "ex-centric" to
"the discourse of a self."

The establishing of triadic

dialogue in a literature class would, then, require more
than either information retrieval or subjective responses
to literature.

Felman's acknowledgment of Otherness

recognizes ignorance— both of student and teacher— and
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provides through the introduction of thirdness an avenue
outside ourselves and outside the duality of self and
other, an opportunity for us to discover in our ignorance
new knowledge.
A partial reading of the Romantics by educators is an
inadequate reading, reducing any application of Romanticism
to education to the organic model which has been pervasive
throughout the century.

The Romantics can and should be a

source for paradigm-building in education, but educators
should consider the important critical work on Romanticism
accomplished since the late 1960s— work which reveals the
Romantics' realization of the opposition between
consciousness and nature.

The work of revisionist thinkers

like de Man, Hartman, Bloom, and McFarland should stimulate
educators to build Romantic models dedicated not to organic
connection but to an interpretive or hermeneutic model that
promotes the interminable dialogue which close reading
encourages.
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Notes to Introduction
1.
The New Criticism, a critical approach which originated
in the early 1940s, stressed that each part of a piece of
literature should support the whole, that a poem or story
should demonstrate unity and lend itself to a single
interpretation.
Perhaps the most powerful school in
twentieth-century criticism, the New Criticism included
such diverse theorists as Eliot, Allan Tate, Robert Penn
Warren, Cleanth Brooks, John Crowe Ransom, William K.
Wimsatt, I. A. Richards, William Empson, and others.
Harold Bloom has called them a "secular clergy"; Lindsay
Waters has questioned their "incarnationalist aesthetics,11
with "its organicist notion of the literary symbol"; and de
Man has found their "salvational criticism" to be "overlaid
with intentions of a mythical and religious order . . .
aspir[ing] to an ultimate reconciliation on a cosmic scale"
(see Waters 1; xlv; 1).
2.
I use the word "failure" here not to indict the work
of the Romantics but to indicate the consequences of their
attempts to assuage alienation and division linguistically.

EMERSON'S LEGACY:

CHAPTER 2
A "GREEN AMERICAN TRADITION"?

[T]he green American tradition has its
beginnings in Ralph Waldo Emerson, and
Emerson's 'angle of vision' . . . has
determined its course ever since.
To be
more precise, the green tradition is a
branch of Emersonian thought emphasizing
organic process, vital expression, cultural
and political democracy, and the cultivation
of indigenous art.
(Peck 2)
Has Emerson bequeathed a green legacy of organicism to
American education?

Although John Willinsky credits the

English Romantics for inspiring much of his organic
philosophy in composition and reading and Dewey cites
Wordsworth and Keats more frequently than he does Emerson
when he attempts to define his aesthetics in Art as
Experience. Emerson— as interpreted by educators and
educational criticism-— is the source of much of the organic
philosophy in American education.

He is also central to

the organic philosophies of composition that Willinsky has
studied and criticized; Emerson is especially significant
to an expressionistic-transactionalist debate that is
currently being waged in rhetoric— -a debate that
Willinsky's doctrines reflect.

Emerson's legacy is a

"green American tradition," but it is, I believe,
on misinterpretation.

11

one built
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How central is Emersonian thought to the
Progressives,1 and do they, as well as those educators
following the Progressives, read Emerson's philosophy as
organic?

Emerson is the Romantic whose name is most often

linked to American progressivism or pragmatism and thus to
D e w e y ; moreover, when theorists or critics do not cite
Emerson, they frequently employ him in derived form—
through disciples Thoreau and Whitman.

For example, Harold

Rugg in The Child-Centered School2 grounds his Progressive
call for self-expression in the poetry of Whitman; and in
the 1960s pre-writing researchers Gordon Rohman and Albert
Wlecke— whose pioneering efforts are significant to process
writing theory which is often considered Emersonian in
philosophy— -regard Thoreau as foundational to their organic
theories of writing.

"Natural Continuity":

Dewey's Reading of Emerson

D e w e y 's reading of Emerson is of primary importance to
the dissemination of Emerson's "organic" voice because
Dewey's ideas, though often damaged in transit from one
educator or group to another, were vastly influential.
How, then, did Dewey read Emerson?
In Art as Experience. Dewey uses passages from both W.
H. Hudson and Emerson to illustrate "the mystic aspect of
acute esthetic surrender" or "ecstatic communion" of a
human being with his or her natural surroundings

(28-29).
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Hudson tells of a childhood experience having to do with
the effect the "feathery foliage" of acacia trees on
moonlight nights produced in him:

"...

this tree

seem[ed] more intensely alive than others, more conscious
of me and of my presence"

(qtd. in AE 28).

Dewey then

couples Hudson's experience with Emerson's account of a
walk he experienced as an adult— a walk which Emerson
describes in one of the best-known passages of N a t u r e :
Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at
twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in
my thought[s] any occurrence of special good
fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration.
I am glad to the brink of fear.
(qtd. in AE
28-29)
Dewey concludes that experiences such as these are
"resonances of dispositions acquired in primitive
relationships of the living being to its surroundings"—
dispositions "irrecoverable in distinct or intellectual
consciousness"

(29).

What Dewey has taken from Nature is

Emerson's expression of a longing for an escape from the
burden of consciousness; this longing becomes apparent when
one considers the remainder of the passage.
The remaining wor d s — possibly the most famous passage
in the book-— may actually have better illustrated the
"mystic" or "ecstatic" communion Dewey wishes to
demonstrate:

the scene is that of Emerson's becoming a

"transparent e y eball ."

The remainder of the p a s s a g e -

beginning immediately after the last sentence Dewey offers
— is as follows:

14
In the woods, t o o , a man casts off his years, as
the snake his slough, and at what period soever
of life is always a child.
In the woods is
perpetual y o u t h . . . . Standing on the bare
ground,— my head bathed by the blithe air and
uplifted into infinite space,-— all mean egotism
vanishes.
I become a transparent eyeball. . . .
(my emphasis and my ellipses) (Nature 24)
In the final part of the quotation that Dewey has
cited, Emerson says he is "glad to the brink of fea r " ; then
he writes,

"in the w o o d s , t o o , a man casts off his years"

and "at whatever period soever of life is always a child
[my emphasis]."

He rhapsodizes about "perpetual youth" in

the woods and about "all mean egotism vanish[ing]" when he
becomes a "transparent eyeball."
Why, then,

is Emerson "glad to the brink of fear" in

the passage Dewey quotes?

Dewey concludes that Emerson's

joy issues from deposits from a primitive past—
"irrecoverable" in our conscious thinking— a past when
human beings lived in close relations to their environment:
he calls this state "natural continuity"

(29) .

But is the

source of Emerson's joy revealed in the words that
immediately follow— those that Dewey o m i t s , those that link
the two sentences with the transitional word too?

For the

second sentence reveals the joy to be also located— that
is, as has been the "exhilaration" of the earlier sentence
quoted by Dewey— in the casting off of his y e a r s , in the
recovery of his innocence,

in his enjoyment of "perpetual

y o u t h ," in his savoring the loss of consciousness of self

15
— in essence,

in Emerson's realizing how "all mean egotism

vanish[es]" in events such as the ones he has experienced
in the woods and in crossing the common.
In Emerson's accounts of these two experiences, we see
what Joseph Kronick refers to as "one of the great themes
of Romanticism— self-consciousness"
the Romantics, says Kronick,

(39) ; what anguishes

is the recognition that human

beings are forever divided from nature" because
"perception, the means by which man comes to understand
nature, severs him from the world . . . .

man dwells in the

in-between; he belongs to neither the self nor to nature"
(55).

What Emerson perceives is not "continuity" with his

natural surroundings but an acute consciousness of his
separation from them:

nature is stable, permanent; human

beings are time-bound, mortal.
Childhood, then, offers a shelter from consciousness.
When Emerson "casts off his years" and accomplishes
"perpetual y o u t h ," he dispenses with the onus of s e l f :
"all mean egotism vanishes" in his contemplation of a time
before thought, certainly a time before one has thoughts of
death.

Geoffrey Hartman believes the "Romantic poets do

not exalt consciousness per se.

They have recognized it as

a kind of death-in-life, as the product of a division in
the self."

Childhood and "certain irrevocable m o m e n t s ,"

concludes Hartman, remind the poet that he has "purchased
with death the life of the mind"

("Romanticism" 303).
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What de Man has argued in "The Rhetoric of
Temporality" is that the Romantics' use of the symbol to
express a perceived relationship between human beings and
nature may be construed as allegory:

though symbolic

identification is desired by the poet, allegorical
difference results.

Emerson desires to forget his self-

consciousness, to see his egotism vanish, to become a
transparent eyeball; however, his language reveals not
identity with nature but the difference between
unselfconscious nature and a time-bound mortal.
D e w e y , unlike Emerson, regards language as
transparent.

He argues in Experience and Nature that

symbolism "is a direct vehicle, a concrete embodiment,
vital incarnation"

(82).

a

When he sees "natural continuity"

in Emerson's exhilaration, he subscribes to a symbolic
theory of language-— one which "would suppose that this
abyss can be bridged," but, as Kronick a r g u e s , "language
names the void and does not bridge it"

(62).

Barbara Packer speaks of the "discouraging arithmetic"
that reveals the disparity between the "serene and profound
moments" Emerson speaks of in "Experience"— moments when
Reason is apprehended (such as the transparent eyeball
scene) •— and the experience of life "as it presents itself
to the senses"
constitute

(129-134).

These "visionary moments"

what Emerson calls his "half a dozen reasonable

hours" in fifty years

(129).

What Packer designates as
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Emerson's "visionary moments" and what de Man and Bloom
have called "moments of peace" and "flashes," Emerson
documents in his journals and essays again and again with
words expressing a unity unattained and u n a ttainable.
These moments he describes in Nature as "delicious
awakenings"
moments"

(43) ; in journal entries they become "certain

(62), "a moist, warm, glittering, budding,

melodious hour" or "a bright hour"
sunshine"
moment"

(328).

(86),

"a moment of

In "Experience" the flashes come "for a

(261) or constitute "only a half-hour" of "angel-

whispering"

(265).

Yet these evanescent moments constitute

the whole of an interpretive tradition— the green American
tradition— that has defined Emerson for American education.
"Natural continuity" is not represented in the Emerson
passage Dewey has q u o t e d , and the "ecstatic communion" that
Dewey reads into it is undercut by Emerson's desire to
escape from self-consciousness.

De Man has written of the

futility of any attempt to establish unity through
language:
Critics who speak of a 'happy relationship'
between matter and consciousness fail to realize
that the very fact that the relationship has to
be established within the medium of language
indicates that it does not exist in actuality.
(IS 8)
Thomas Alexander's 1987 study of D e w e y 's aesthetics3
demonstrates the importance of the idea of continuity to
Dewey.

Continuity,

says Alexander,

is the core of D e w e y 's

"metaphysics" and "the underlying idea in D e w e y 's

conception of 'an experience'"

(xvii).

Continuity, he

maintains, eliminates the "mind-body problem" in Dewey
"connects naturalism with emergentism"
continuity, Alexander argues,

(98).

and

With

the "organic model,

so

important for Dewey from the start of his career, achieves
mature expression . . . " (99).
And though Alexander does not directly link Dewey's
theory of continuity with either Emerson or "organic
Romanticism," he does not insist, as many Dewey scholars
do, that Dewey's philosophy is unrelated to Romanticism:
Too often is pragmatism understood as fostering a
spirit inimical to that sponsored by the
Romantics . Clearly in D e w e y 's case we see a
stern attempt to transform many of the ideas of
romanticism into practicable and realizable
goals.
The romantic dimension of D e w e y 's thought
cannot be safely ignored [original e mphasis].
(283)
While it is apparent that Alexander sees Dewey as
transforming Romanticism from the ineffectual or
unrealizable to the pragmatic,

I believe D e w e y 's aesthetics

establish not a "romantic dimension" but an organic
dimension.
In A Common F a i t h . Dewey addresses the p o e t 's use of
organic synthesis:
The ties binding man to nature that poets have
always celebrated are passed over lightly. . . .
A religious attitude, h o w e v e r , needs the sense of
a connection of man, in the way of both
dependence and support, with the enveloping world
that the imagination feels is a u n i v e r s e . (53)

Dewey finds worth in the poet's establishing "ties binding
man to nature" and connecting human beings "with the
enveloping world."

In fact, the faculty by which the

synthesis is to be accomplished— the imagination— is
defined by Dewey in Experience and Nature as an "organ of
n a t u r e ."

He adds,

of no illusion.

"A purely stable world . . . .

. . . It just exists"

(62).

permits

The "romantic

dimension" of Dew e y 's aesthetics is not Emersonian but
organic.

When Dewey speaks of symbolic language as a

"concrete embodiment" and a "vital incarnation" and the
imagination as an "organ of n a t u r e ," his words reflect what
Jonathan Culler has said of organicism:
merely a natural analogue.

" [It] is not

It is also a theological idea

. . ." (155).
Hartman has commented that Romantic literature has
a function analogous to that of religion.
The
traditional scheme of Eden, fall, and redemption
merges with the new triad of n a t u r e , selfconsciousness , imagination:
while the last term
in both involves a kind of return to the first.
("Romanticism" 307)
After the fall, the Christian yearns for redemption, which
promises a return to Eden;

Har t m a n , howe v e r , states that

the Romantic artist never wishes for a return to nature, or
union with nature (as an organic reading implies)

but,

instead, yearns for a recovery of unselfconsciousness, what
Bloom refers to as a recouping of his former "selfless
self"

(15-16).

Dewey's veneration of the imagination apparently
coincides with that of the Romantics; h o w e v e r , there is a
significant difference.

Dewey looks to the imagination to

supply the tie that binds, that connects.

The Romantics

desire not union with nature but a transcendence of n a t u r e :
"It is the destiny of consciousness, or as the English
Romantics would have said, of Imagination, to separate from
nature,

so that it can finally transcend not only nature

but also its own lesser forms [my emphasis]" (Hartman,
"Romanticism" 301).

Dewey's description of imagination,

like the reading of the Romantics by literary historians
and the organic textual theories of the New Criticism,
much more theological idea.4

is a

Moreover, his organic

reading of Emerson is not refuted by educators who followed
Dewey.

In three studies appearing in three different

decades— from the 1960s to the 1980s— educators evaluated
Emerson's work as organic.

More Organic Readin g s :

Merging with Roses and Rivers

James Dickinson G r a n t 's 1985 Harvard dissertation
argues that Dewey not only continued in the tradition of
Emerson but that Emerson actually influenced D e w e y .
He defines Emerson as an organicist whose "integrated"
and holistic

(79)

(177) perspective, whose belief in "wholeness"

and "connection"

(133),

relation, and continuity"

whose insistence on "connection,
(175) influenced D e w e y .
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Important also is Grant's assertion that Emerson
contributed to Dewey's aesthetics5 (79; 175) with his idea
that "the aesthetic experience is continuous with common
experience. . . (175).

In other w o r d s , Grant argues

that Emerson is, like Dewey, a philosopher who unifies.
The concepts of integration, wholism, connection,
relation, and continuity frequently appear in organicist,
not pragmatist, t e x t s .

Although Dewey argued that when he

used words like whole and integration in Art as Exper i e n c e .
he used them as they apply to aesthetic experiences and
•'not to experiences of other kinds"

("Experience" 551) ,

critics accused him of damaging his pragmatism with an
organic aesthetics.6

The question I raise, h o w e v e r , is

whether these concepts are used similarly in the works of
Dewey and Emerson.

G r a n t 's thesis requires him to connect

their philosophies; howe v e r , Emerson's philosophy does not
reflect wholism and unity.
Both Grant and Alexander have stressed the importance
of the idea of continuity in Deweyan philosophy, and Dewey
himself calls for a poet's synthesizing imagination in
making these connections.

Howe v e r , the Romantics know that

language names the chasm between themselves and n a t u r e .
they recognize the break as irreversible, have they
succeeded in establishing the tie connecting humanity and
nature that Dewey envisions?

According to G r a n t , both

Emerson and Dewey regard continuity as occurring "through

If
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interaction with nature” (96).

Thus, Grant must

demonstrate how Emerson acknowledges humanity's connection
with an "enveloping world."

He attempts to do so by using

a passage from "Self-Reliance":
These roses under my window make no reference to
former roses or to better o n e s ; they are for what
they are; they exist with God t o - d a y . There is
no time to them.
There is simply the rose; it is
perfect in every moment of its existence. . . .
But man postpones or remembers; he does not live
in the present, but with reverted eye laments the
past, or, heedless of the riches that surround
him, stands on tiptoe to foresee the future.
He
cannot be happy and strong until he too lives
with nature in the present, above time.
(qtd. in
Grant 75)
Grant reads this passage as a reflection of Emerson's
belief

(shared with Dewey) that "life is essentially

experience" and that the "fullest possible experience is
marked by full integration of organism and e n vironment,"
the "indication of this full integration" being the
"ability to live fully in the present . . . "

(75).

Hence,

Grant uses this passage to join D e w e y 's call for
integrating the human being with the "enveloping world"
with what he considers to be similar organic sentiments in
Emerson.

H o wever, Grant misreads Emerson.

What Emerson

says in the passage is not symbolic; there is no identity,
only difference.

The human being is self-conscious,

mortal— in short, is becoming.
Man would say of the rose,
coincide"

(IS 4).

The rose, h o w e v e r , i s .

"...

De

existence and essence

Grant omits the two sentences that open

the rose passage and elides two sentences appearing in the
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middle of the passage; they appear below in the order I
have named:
Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer
upright; he dares not say 'I t h i n k , ' 'I a m , ' but
quotes some saint or sage.
He is ashamed before
the blade of grass or the blowing rose.
•

•

•

o

Before a leaf bud has burst, its whole life acts;
in the full-blown flower there is no more; in the
leafless root there is no less.
Its nature is
satisfied and its satisfies nature in all moments
alike.
(SR 157)
Grant reads the rose passage as an endorsement of
living "fully in the pres e n t ," (75);

Emerson, h o w e v e r ,

questions whether postponing, remembering, tiptoeing human
beings can ever secure the satisfied stability of the rose
living "above time."

Grant has proposed ”full integration

of organism and environment” as a condition for living
fully in the present; h o w e v e r , Emerson's words reflect no
integration of the rose and the human being.

Grant

confuses Emerson's privileging of the present moment with a
spatializing self-presence.
says,

In "Self-Reliance" Emerson

"This one fact the world h a t e s ; that the soul

b e c o m e s : for that forever degrades the past . . . "

(158).

What he acknowledges in this statement is that human beings
are bound by time.

In privileging the present m o m e n t ,

Emerson makes an ontological, not an organic, assertion.
In misreading the rose passage, Grant erroneously credits
Emerson with having established what Dewey e n d o r s e s :
binding man to n a t u r e ."

"ties

In the rose passage Emerson grapples with the temporal
dilemma of the human being who cannot be buoyed by the
thought of a correlation between the "satisfied" rose-—
"perfect in every moment of its existence"-— and the human
being who cannot emulate this essence.

The rose lives

"with nature in the present, above time."

Langu a g e , or

self-consciousness, lets the human being think the
difference; the rose is, as Whitman in "Song of Myself"
says of unselfconscious animals,

"placid and self-

contained. "
Emerson's rose expresses fully the Romantic sense of
estrangement:

the rose is; the human being is becoming.

Friedrich Schlegel represents Romanticism as "an eternal
'becoming' that has as its chief characteristic that it
'nie vollendet sein kann'— can never be completed (qtd. in
McFarland,
contained.

13).

The rose is complete, placid,

self-

Human beings feel incomplete and fragmented.

Emerson says in "Experience":

"I know better than to claim

any completeness for my picture.
is a fragment of me"

(272).

I am a fragment, and this

Thomas McFarland sees this

incompleteness and fragmentation as constitutive of
Romanticism (7), and he suggests that the Romantic
preoccupation with infinity as a solution to problems of
temporality is accompanied, paradoxically e n o u g h , by the
poet's perception of parts-— fragments that can only hint at
"the hypothetical wholeness of infinity"

(28-29).

The

25
fragmentation and the parts, says McFarland, are the
reality.
Emerson's work is replete with statements reflecting
the distinction our minds make between our own feeling of
fragmentation and the stability of infinite n a t u r e ; the
problem, he reasons,

is our self-consciousness.

In

Emerson, images of binding, belting, strapping, and girding
reveal the human condition; on the other hand,

images of

fluidity and vigor characterize the infinity of n a t u r e .
His essays and journals declare the human desire for
liberty— "freedom boundless I wish"

("Journals" 137)— but

they also reveal the reality of "a strap or belt which
girds the world"

("Fate" 46)— a "bounded world, bounded

everywhere— all immoveably boun d e d , no liquidity of hope or
genius"

("Journals" 329).

He represents self-consciousness as the problem:
But the man is as it were clapped into jail
by his consciousness. . . . Ah, that he
could pass again into his neutrality!
Who
can thus avoid all pledges and, having
observed, observe again from the same
unaffected, unbiased, unbribable,
unaffrighted innocence,— must always be
formidable. . . . (SR 149)
The alienation arises from t h o u g h t , but Emerson's only
remedy for what Hegel calls man's "unhappy consciousness"
is to "pass again into his neutrality," that is, to return
to an unselfconscious state of childhood.

Of course,

Emerson realizes this to be no legitimate alternative.
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Elsewhere he says,

"Every thought is also a prison.

.

. . "; however, he proposes that the poet might "unlock our
chains” and provide "emancipation” with "a new thought”
coming from "greater depth” ("Poet" 36).

The new poet that

Emerson proposes, he concedes that he has not found,

for

"Time and nature yield us many gifts, but not yet the
timely man, the new religion, the reconciler, whom all
things await"

(238).

While Emerson has not found the

"timely m a n ” or the "reconciler,” his search for freedom
from thought is a Romantic refrain.

Bloom has shown the

objective of the search not to be that which traditional
criticism has proposed— the poet's uniting of self and
nature— -but a recovery of unselfconsciousness.

The

Romantic poet was, according to Bloom, a
seeker not after nature but after his own mature
p o wers, and so [he] turned away, not from society
to nature, but from nature to what
was more
integral than nat u r e , within himself.
The
widened consciousness of the poet did not give
him intimations of a former union with nature or
the Divine, but rather of his former selfless
self.
(15-16)
McFarland contrasts the Romantics' reality of
fragmentation with their attraction to infinity; that
attraction, he says,

is often represented by the ocean as

infinity and by the stream as a symbol of process

(28).

In

"Experience," Emerson struggles to name "the sentiment from
which it [consciousness] sprung, to name "this unbounded
substance."
we can

He writes that the word

"Being"

come to naming the "ineffable c a u s e " : ".

is as close as
. . we
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have arrived as far as we can go.

Suffice it for the joy

of the universe that we have not arrived at a wall, but at
interminable oceans” (268).
G ra n t 's use of the rose to explain Emerson's
compulsion to connect typifies education's interpretation
of the Romantics.

At times the misreading has come from an

educator's incomplete grasp of the t e x t s ; at other t i m e s ,
educators have listened to the voices of literary
historians and critics.

But the characterizations of

Emerson as an organic philosopher are the standard, not
the exception.
In his 1972 s t u d y , Richard Welke Cass attempts to
plumb Emerson's work for its implications in reforming
curriculum.

He says the

. . correspondence between mind

and matter, subject and object, physical laws and moral
laws is for Emerson the key to knowledge and the basis for
knowing"

(54).

Emerson,

in Cass's interpretation, becomes

a reconciler of epistemological dualisms:
theory of knowledge, then,

"Emerson's

is more than either cognitive or

blind faith [;] it is a unification of rational cognition
with intuitive perception"

(113).7

To illustrate his own organic conception of
curriculum, Cass draws an extensive analogy between
Emerson's view of the human mind and the natural
characteristics of the Mississippi River— a symbolic
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rendering inspired, or so he apparently believes, by the
organic ideas of Emerson:
The mind Emerson sees in man metaphorically
resembles a mighty river, one like Twain's
Mississippi, p e r h a p s . Like this river, man's
thought draws from an enormous watershed for its
ever appearing and always renewed substance.
•

•

•

•

Like this Mississippi, then, Emerson's conception
resembles the river's ceaseless process of
skillfully going somewhere by being broad but by
also being defined. . . [man] must be able to
know intuitively, see generally, and refocus to
the horizon.
Man's knowing, then, must be a
three-dimensional matrix of broad and deep
movements. (149-151)
In the Cass interpretation, Emerson offers organic
synthesis of intuitive and cognitive ways of knowing in a
"ceaseless process," which is both "broad" and "defined."
Emerson, h o wever, sees division, not synthesis.

Cass's

reading of Emerson as a wholistic philosopher exhibits
strands of New Critical organicism.

Though he does not

acknowledge the New Criticism's attack on Romanticism, he
does apply a New Critical apparatus.

Cass uses T. S.

Eliot's objective correlative in reading Emerson's "The
Over-Soul":
The pattern and movement of the essay reproduces
something of the pattern by which the Over-Soul
functions in man.
Hence the essay, itself,
becomes the objective correlative of the working
of the Over-Soul, a concept which the essay is
simultaneously trying discursively to define.
(23-24)
Not only does Cass read Emerson as a reconciler, but he
also sees, New Critically, an organic totality of effect in
the Emerson essay.
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Like Dewey and Grant, Cass attributes to Emerson
powers of synthesis and reconciliation which Emerson
himself desires but never achieves.

Emerson records in his

journal:
The bread which we ask of Nature is that she
should entrance us, but amidst her beautiful or
her grandest pictures I cannot escape the second
thought.
I walked this P. M. in the w o o d s , but
there too the snowbanks were sprinkled with
tobacco-juice. We have the wish to forget night
and day, father and mother, food and ambition,
but we never lose our dualism [original
emphasis]. (275)
Perhaps the most extravagant claim made for Emerson's
unifying powers and the application of those powers to
education appears in Rena Lee Williams Foy's "The
Philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Its Educational
Implications"
As a result,
proposes.

(1962).

Foy reads Emerson as an idealist.

she transcendentalizes the curriculum she

As Cass had drawn epistemological implications

from "the ceaseless process" of the Emersonian Mississippi
River, Foy wishes to stamp curriculum with Emersonian
eternal processes of "striving" and "advancing" toward what
she theocritically terms "ascension":
Throughout the writings of Emerson, there is
affirmed an unwavering faith in a universal order
of t h ings, the order is not static, but each
component part is striving for ascension— to the
One, the Great Unity.
(9)
The concern with parts-to-whole relationships issues from
the reality of the Romantics' fragmented being, but the
Romantic emphasis, according to McFarland, always falls on
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the parts.

Foy, however, believes Emerson has transcended

the dualisms, and she metaphysically focuses on the Whole,
the One, the Great Unity.

Since component parts of the

Emersonian doctrine are "striving for ascension," then the
Foy-informed classroom will duplicate this process:
Since all diversity at last blends into unity,
the student’s progress should be marked by
increasing ability to organize, classify, relate,
and synthesize.
The sequence is from the
learning of facts to philosophy. (354)
Foy also applies unity to the study of morals; n a t u r e , she
says, provides the model for moral instruction:
"The teaching of the ascension process gives the child a
sense of being caught up on an advancing continuum . . . "
(343).

Foy's reading of Emerson is, in sho r t , organic and

theological.

Emersonian Process Writing
Winifred Horner has shown that until quite recently
composition research has largely been accomplished by
schools of education, not by departments of English (6),
and James Berlin has said the history of composition is
"closely related" to the history of American education (RR
1).

Not surprisingly, then,

"Romantic" rhetoricians, often

educators or researchers working closely with educational
theorists, adopt an organic reading of Emerson.
John Willinsky explains writing as a "method of
connecting, of integrating the learner into what is to be
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learned.

. . " (NL 56), and he bases his organic theories

of process8 writing on British Romanticism; however, his
research also draws heavily from American sources.

Though

Willinsky does not specifically cite Emerson as a Romantic
source for his New Literacy, other American process
theorists do.

In fact, within process p e d a g o g y , both

expressionistic and transactional theorists specify Emerson
as forebear.
Berlin has graphed movements within composition
pedagogy in American colleges through both nineteenth- and
twentieth-century manifestations.

An epistemic

transactionalist, he grounds his own theories in the
democratic, social, communal aspects of Emer s o n .

However,

Berlin readily acknowledges that Emerson is claimed by
expressionists who see him in a very different way:
individualist concerned with self-expression.

as an

Although

these two groups have conflicting aims, each looks to
Emerson as foundational.
similarly:

Stranger still, each reads him

as an organicist.

In his history of nineteenth-century rhetoric,
Berlin's chapter on "Emerson and Romantic Rhetoric" claims
Emerson for the transactionalists.

And though Mark Wiley's

essay interpreting the work of two leading expressionists—
Peter Elbow and Donald Bartholomae9— designates Emerson an
expressionist, a common ground does emerge in the two
interpretations:

an organic and metaphysical reading of
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Emerson.

Both Berlin's and Wiley's process theories

emphasize a symbolic view of language.

This view, the

Coleridgean position, has been defined by Ann Berthoff as
mind and nature "sha r [ing] with nature an organic
character— an essentially active, growing, developing,
transforming power” (59).

This symbolic, Coleridgean

position also defines Willinksy's position on process
writing:
The process model of writing would seem to
provide a clear instance of Coleridge's
'blending, fusing' powers of the imagination to
the classroom.
In the process model, the teacher
ensures that the student's writing takes on a
development of its own . . . . until it achieves
a kind of organic independence. (”Seldom” 274)
Like Willinsky, American theorists embrace organicism, but
they most frequently use Emerson rather than the British
Romantics as a m o d e l .
Berlin's argument that language is the key to
Emerson's epistemology is one that I have also advanced,
but Berlin sees a different Emerson, one who “locates the
real in the fusion of the sensual and ideal” and who says
"knowledge is possible only in the interaction of the two"
(46).

This is, of course, Emerson as symbol-maker,

reconciler, and uniter.

According to Berlin,

it is

Emerson's use of metaphor that establishes a "point of
intersection between outside and inside” (48).
Berlin says Emerson believes that nature supplies us
with the language through which our sense perceptions of
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the material world can express the ideal (48).

In Berlin's

interpretation of Emerson, then, sense perceptions link
human beings to n a t u r e .

Joseph Kronick has spoken of

Emerson's concern with "the medium of perception."
According to Kronick,

"Emejrson's use of the word perception

. . . is indistinguishable from the concept of mediation."
Perception,

in other w o r d s , does not link the subject and

object; it mediates.

Kronick continues,

"What concerns

Emerson is the medium of perception; we can never see the
thing-in-itself because the medium of the senses intervenes
between self and object [original emphasis]" (55) .
says,

Emerson

"This slight discontinuity which perception effects

between mind and the object paralyzes the will"
Kronick 55).

(qtd. in

In Emerson's view, then, perception does not

link material nature and the ideal but intervenes between
self and object.
In "The Poet" Emerson does not find the making of
metaphor a "natural" thing:
For poetry was all written before time was, and
whenever we are so finely organized that we can
penetrate into that region where the air is
music, we hear those primal warblings and attempt
to write them down, but we lose ever and anon a
word or a verse and substitute something of our
own, and thus miswrite the poem.
(224)
The necessity of "substitut[ing] something of our o w n ,"
Emerson believes,

is due to the discontinuity existing

between nature and the poet:
Language is fossil poetry. . . . so language is made
up of images or tropes, which now in their secondary

34
u s e , have long ceased to remind us of their poetic
origin [my emphasis]. ("Poet" 231)
As Kronick tells us,

"Language does not link mind and

na ture, for nature has its own visual g r a m m a r , and
intellect must borrow a language [my emphasis]" (61).
Kronick indicates that Emerson is well aware of the
inadequacy of symbolic language; instead of "bridg[ing] the
gap between subject and object," Emerson looks on language
as "creat[ing] the abyss wherever it appears"

(61).

Berlin, h o wever , believes Emerson endorses the "use of
m et a p h o r . . . as the paradigm for all language use"

(48).

He reads Emerson as indicating that " [s]ubject and object
have meaning only in the creation of the unifying symbol"
(48).

Because of his own belief in the social and

transactional uses of writing, Berlin looks for the social
in Emerson; he says Emerson "spells out [language's ] role
in public discourse.

. . . [Itl must be metaphoric"

(51).

In Berlin's analysis Emerson seems to imply that metaphoric
language is to be called up only as an act of w i l l ;
Emerson, h o wever, recognizes figuration as integral to
language:

language is "fossil poetry" made up of images

and tropes "now in their secondary uses."
then,

Language is,

"always figurative through and through"

(Miller 48).

According to Berlin's perception of Emerson, the writer
achieves a "metaphoric display" only after concrete
experience and the idea have been united; thus he
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interprets Emerson as insisting on the importance of
"contact with all of a language's resources"

(52).

Emerson says language decays and "old words are
perverted to stand for things which are not; a paper
currency is employed, when there is no bullion in the
vaults . . . "

(qtd. in Berlin 52).

But Berlin interprets

Emerson's dissatisfaction with the capacity of language to
represent reality as an exhortation for writers to create
fresh metaphors to express t r u t h .

He reads Emerson as

endorsing a "fresh union of object and idea" so that these
new metaphors might express truth (52-53).
Berlin has misread Emerson.

He sums up Emerson's

influence on process rhetoric with these w o r d s :
Emerson's rhetoric, not restricted to securing a
desired effect on the audience, was attempting to
restore the search for truth to the composing
act.
Truth, moreover, is organic, is a holistic
product growing out of the entire rhetorical
situation— reality, speaker, listener, and
language. All are involved in discovery and each
changes in response to each.
(WI 57)
Finally, Berlin says,

"...

one does not have to be a

philosophical idealist to see reality as the convergence of
perceiver and perceived with language as the agent of
mediation"

(57) .

With an organic interpretat ion of

Emerson's language philosophy at its base, Berlin's
transactional theory insists on the convergence of subject
and object through language.

In this insistence on

language as a vehicle of union, Berlin subscribes to what
Derrida calls the "metaphysics of presence."

Sharon
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Crowley has explained this relationship of language,
consciousness, and the world:
. . . by a kind of doubling movement, the
relation of signification that exists between
voice and mind is transferred to the relation of
minds to nature.
In other words, the metaphysics
of presence assumes two sets of similar
relations:
as minds represent or signify the
substances of natu r e , so does language represent
or signify the 'stuff' of minds, and through
this, natu r e . . . . Thus traditional metaphysics
constructed a self-sealing argument regarding the
representative relationships that exist between
minds, the world, and language. (3)
Mark Wiley's attaching of expressionistic theory to
Emerson's thought focuses not on the social, democratic
aspects of Emerson that Berlin stresses but on Emerson's
individualism:

Wiley represents his subjects— Elbow and

Bartholomae— as theorists who argue for student
empowerment.

Wiley says the two compositionists help

students gain "real voice" by encouraging them to resist
authority; they are to do this by making language their
own.

Once again, a critic speaks of language as a tool, as

a medium of communication; Emerson, h o w e v e r , expresses
doubts as to the capacity of language to make thought
phenomenal.
Wiley says,

"Elbow's trope of real voice resonates

with . . . Emerson's belief that our words originate from
things"

(59).

Howev e r , he, in the doubling movement

Crowley has described, maintains that Emerson
desires the things themselves to speak through a
language generated through intellectual acts
focused on their experiences.
Language is used
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by a person to get bevond words in order to
reconnect oneself with the world [my emphasis].
(59)
This idea of getting beyond words to reconnect oneself
with the world is not Emersonian:

Emerson recognizes the

split between signifier and signified, between subject and
object.

Adopting the "right" word, Wiley says, may aid a

writer insofar as "the relationship between self and
objects in the world is revealed through the proper use of
language"

(59).

Once again, the interpretation is language

as a tool, a way of accessing reality; and once again, the
reading is organic:
with the world.

words will aid in reconnecting oneself

Wiley interprets expressionism as

encouraging writers "to get beyond words" in making these
connections.10
Eager to relieve the expressionists from the charge
that they are excessively subjective, even solipsistic,
he declares real voice to signify "a special type of social
entity"; peer response groups become "small, closed
communities."

While striving for real voice is still

theoretically an "individual activity," it is "carried out
in a public sphere; h e n c e , it is simultaneously personal
and transpersonal, and in a wide sense, religious in
nature."

Individuals strive to "realize a power within,

which, when manifested, transcends the individual and
unites the group"

(61).

This "power within" issues from

what Wiley calls "the Emersonian imperative for each person
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to seek the 'God within.'”

He suggests this power might be

called the unconscious, the soul, or instinct but that its
function is "to reunite the person with the w o r l d ” (61).
The function of the "power within" is, in Wiley's
rendering, a mystical, organic unifying of the person with
the world.
Debrah Raschke— -a transactional theorist— -regards the
"real voice" of expressionist rhetoric as a Romanticism
perilously close to solipsism-— the indictment Wiley seems
aware of when he speaks of expressionist peer editing as
social, public, communal.

Raschke regards the

expressionist self as "a self beyond language," one
"created away from and without dialogue with the rest of
society."

And Raschke regards the expressionists' use of

peer editing as "subtly rein f o r e [ing] this personal
landscape"

(6).

More significant than her interpretation

of Emerson as the cornerstone of expressionism is her
misreading of Emerson.

She interprets him as endorsing the

idea that language is "neutral and p u r e ," and she
characterizes him as unifying the Not Me and Me,
all of it into a mirror of his own m i n d . "
says,

"turning

Emerson, she

"essentially denies difference, denies the dialectic

by making it all a unified whole contained within the human
mind"

(9-10).

Raschke obviously wishes to place Emerson

in the expressionist group Wiley has characterized.
so, she misreads both Emerson's theory of language

To do
(she
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sees him as a symbolist) and his message of unity.

She too

reads him as organic.
Two different Emersons emerge from the
transactiona1ist and expressionist uses of Emerson;
however, the two schools are one in their organic reading
of E m erson.

With their emphasis on (or ambivalence about)

an interpretive community,11 what the two schools reflect
is the tension Gregory Desilet has seen between what he
labels as "rhetoric” and as "communication.”

He says the

compositionists who stress communication as establishing
"shared meaning" through a community of interpreters is a
hermeneutic position that is metaphysical:
. . . hermeneutics retains the key feature of
metaphysical orientations: concealed preference.
Hermeneutics leans to one side of the
same/different opposition in the ease with which
it assumes communication, as the sharing of
meaning, to be pervasive in the use of language.
This choice privileges the sameness of
intersubjectivity in the self/other relation,
thereby upsetting the balance in the
individual/collective relation.
(153)
This is Berlin's epistemic

(transactional) position,

one

that places great emphasis on the intersubjective and
social contexts of communication while at the same time
rejecting the expressionists for their individual or
private visions.

"Acceptance by a consensus of others

becomes the basic criterion for what counts as knowledge"
in Desilet's interpretation of hermeneutic communication
(156).

In privileging collective over individual

interpretation, Desilet says,

"communication" shows its
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metaphysical mooring.

On the other hand,

"rhetoric," as

Desilet distinguishes it, "conveys the stimulation and
provocation of meaning with the additional advantage of
neither implying nor precluding shared meaning"
This view, he says,

(169).

is represented by Derridean post-

structural i s m .
Desilet cites the work of Steven Mailloux, who has
distinguished two hermeneutics:

first,

"hermeneutic

realism," in which "meanings are discovered, not created,"
with texts determining interpretation and, second,
"hermeneutic idealism," in which "meaning is made, not
found," with communal interpretation creating the text
(qtd. in Desilet 174).

Hermeneutic idealism is the

description which best characterizes what Desilet sees in
the hermeneutic emphasis on "shared meaning."
Berlin's pedgogy requires shared, communal
interpretation.

In this,

in his misreading of Emerson's

understanding of language,12 and in his view of Emerson as
organicist, Berlin reflects a philosophy with metaphysical
shadings.

In his attempt to secure Emerson for social,

epistemic composition theory, Berlin must deny Emerson's
subjectivity while at the same time privileging what he
views as Emerson's symbolic theory of language.

Though

Berlin and Wiley see in Emerson a foundation for
conflicting rhetorical theories, they hold in common the
notion of an Emerson with powers of reconciliation.
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Sources of an Organic Emerson
What is the explanation for the organic interpretation
of Emerson that pervades education?

Even the

interpretation that seems to issue from an educator's own
careless reading possibly has been prompted by two powerful
sources that he or she is perhaps unaware o f :
historians and the New Criticism.

literary

Jasper Neel tells of the

omnipresent authority of the New Criticism and Northrop
F r y e 's myth criticism:

"These two systems led to tens of

thousands of articles and books explaining the true meaning
of each poem, play, and novel in the Anglo-American
tradition” (57).

The critical interpretations of these

authoritative voices have provided a base for studies in
English for generations.

Sharon Crowley reveals how M. H.

Abrams assumed "an authoritative reading” for a piece of
literature— -"a reading which would put a stop to all other
readings and which would, then, not itself be readable
(that is, open to criticism)" (20).

These critical

interpretations foster the single best meaning while
restraining others.
would,

The result is an interpretation that

in Crowley's w o r d s , "put a stop" to other

interpretations.
These "authoritative" readings of the Romantics
produced a single way of regarding the Romantics:

as

organicists who wished to reconcile self and n a t u r e .

In

1962 a Rene Wellek essay was published in an edition which
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Frye edited and titled Romanticism Reconsidered.

In his

essay Wellek gives a synoptic survey of G e r m a n , French, and
American Romantic criticism of the twentieth cent u r y ; he
finds almost univocal agreement.
He says that a "neglected" German work advances the
"once central and valid concept:

the reconciling,

synthetic imagination as the common denominator of
Romanticism"

(113).

He credits Morse Peckham for "singling

out the criterion of 'organic dynamism' as the definition
of Romanticism"

(109).

He commends Beguin's "understanding

of the nature of the Romantic imagination and its
rootedness in a sense of the continuity between man and
nature and the presence of God"

(121), and he finds

Poulet's evaluation of "all Romanticism" wisely summarized
as an "effort to overcome the oppositon of subject and
object . . . "

(122).

A b r a m s , he credits with having

established "the chief theme of continuity.
important Romantic poems"

. . in many

(125), and he commends Wilson

Knight for having come "to the right conclusion that
Wordsworth aims at a 'fusion of mind with nature to create
a living paradise . . .'" (127).

Finally, Wellek

summarizes the collective, monolithic wisdom of decades of
Romantic theorizing:
In all of these studies, however diverse in
method and emphasis, a convincing agreement has
been reached:
they all see the implication of
imagination, symbol, myth, and organic n a t u r e ,
and see it as part of the great endeavor to
overcome the split between subject and object,

43
the self and the world, the conscious and the
unconscious. This is the central creed of the
great Romantic poets in England, Germany, and
Fran c e . It is a closely coherent body of thought
and feeling.
(131-32)
T. S. Eliot,

leading theorist of the New Criticism,

argued for the transparency of poetic language:
in a healthy state presents the object,
object that the two are identified"

"Language

is so close to the

(qtd. in W a t e r s , x l i v ) .

The Eliot position is the symbolic or organic position that
educators have themselves seen, or have had represented to
them, as being characteristic of Romantic literature.
Eliot's idea that language reflects the object so closely
that the two are one is organic and, as Waters says,
revealing of "an ontological compulsion":

the literary

symbol accesses reality (il).
Catherine Belsey has pointed out the weakness of the
idea that words "inhere timelessly in the phenomenal world
or in the continuity of essential human n a t u r e ."

With

words inhering timelessly, the meaning of a piece of
literature, once determined, becomes petrified.
New Critics failed to acknowledge, Belsey says,

What the
is that

language . . . provides the possibility of
meaning, but because language is not static but
perpetually in proc e s s , what is inherent in the
text is a range of possibilities of meaning. .
. . Meanings are not fixed or given, but are
released in the process of reading. . . (20).
Paradoxically, while New Critical theorists castigated,

on

the one hand, Romantic subjectivity— the way the Romantics
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pondered separation and wholeness— they, on the other hand,
espoused the symbol and organic form.
It is no wonder that education has failed to recognize
that the significant legacy of the Romantics is their
concern with language and consciousness and not organic
unity.

This reduction of Romanticism to organicism13 has

prompted educators to define wholism, unity,
reconciliation,

synthesis, and other components of

organicism as "Romantic.”
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Notes to Chapter 2
1.
Allusions to Emerson and the affinity of his thought
with both Progressivism and pragmatism are abundant.
He is commonly presented as an organic philosopher of
unity and wholism.
Interpretations link him to the educational,
political, and social aspects of Progressivism.
For
example, Daniel Aaron calls him "the real prophet of the
progressive tradition" (Men of Good Hope:
A Storv of
American Progressives, p. 7).
Daniel H. Peck identifies
Emerson as the inspiration for the Progressive "insurgence"
in anthropo1ogy (Veblen), architecture (Sullivan) and
education (Dewey) at the turn of the century in the city of
Chicago; in the same book— The Green American Tradition;
Essavs and Poems for Sherman Paul-— Hugh Dawson points out
correspondences between Emerson and Whitman's organic
philosophy and Louis Sullivan's views on both architecture
and education (see pp. 2; 6-7; 100-108).
See also John F.
R o c h e 's "Building for Democracy:
Organic Architecture in
Relation to Progressive Education." Roche connects
Chicago's "Organic Architecture" and Sullivan and Frank
Lloyd Wright with "the Romantic theory of organicism" (p.
298); D e w e y , he says, drew the respect of both Sullivan and
Wright, both of whom were passionate advocates of "radical
change in education" (p. 305).
See also Lauren S.
Weingarden's Louis Sullivan:
The B a n k s . Weingarden
specifically refers to Sullivan's inheritance of the
"symbol-making project" from Whitman and Emerson (p. 7).
Emerson is also considered a progenitor of
educational progressivism and American pragmatism.
James
Dickinson Grant has called Emerson "an important forerunner
of progressive education in the United States" (p. 2) and
"the father of the distinctly American tradition of
philosophy" (185) ("Ralph Waldo Emerson and John D e w e y : A
Study of Intellectual Continuities and Influence"). And
Cornel West has said Emerson is "the appropriate starting
point for the pragmatists' tradition" (The American Evasion
of Philosophy, p. 6).
In a 1943 study, Albert E. Lewis
says, "Regardless of terminology, Emerson stands at the
fork of the road which leads on to Dewey and Kilpatrick and
the progressive movement of today" ("The Contributions of
Ralph Waldo Emerson to American Education," p. 168).
Denis
Donoghue describes Emersonian thought as a precursor of
pragmatism (Emerson and His L e g a c y , pp. 26-27).
See also
Howard Mumford Jones, who has collected Emerson's work on
education and who points out elements of progressivism in
Emerson's educational philosophy (Emerson on E ducation, pp.
19-20).
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2. Ann Shumaker is listed as a co-author of The ChildCentered S c h o o l ? however, in future references I will use
Rugg alone (one wonders whether Shumaker served in a
research capacity in this endeavor; the style appears to be
pure R u g g ) .
3.
Dewey's aesthetics, not his instrumenta1i s m , is central
to my study of his organicism.
Alexander, h o w e v e r , argues
that "the central guiding thought" in D e w e y 's philosophy is
the "aesthetic dimension of experience" (p. xiii) and that
the "aesthetic experience . . . is an inherent possibility
of most experience" (p. 6).
"What was needed most of all,11
says Alexander, "was an analysis of the relationship
between his description of aesthetic experience and his
instrumenta1ism" (184).
Positing that experience
"underlies both aspects of his philosophy," Alexander
believes "the fundamental condition for instrumentalism is
that experience is capable of integrated fulfillment which
is the result of intelligently directed human activity" (p.
184) .
4.
I make no attempt to characterize D e w e y 's religious
beliefs when I associate organicism with theology.
James
Dickinson Grant quotes Dewey as having said in a letter to
Joseph Ratner that his antipathy to dualism was emotional,
not religious.
Grant concludes that the base of religious
belief in Dewey and Emerson was similar:
"But there is
clearly an affinity of religious spirit between the two
men— both men associate religious experience with a sense
of broad connection between man and nature" (p. 80).
5.
Grant studied the underlined passages and marginal
notations Dewey made in his personal copies of Emerson's
w o r k s ; he also read the class notes Edwin Peck took in the
course on English and American transcendentalism Dewey
taught in 1892.
Peck recorded these remarks of D e w e y 's :
"Emerson saw clearly the absurdity of making art a thing in
itself, more than almost any other man.
Art is a vehicle.
To get this one idea well from Emerson is worth reading
several of his essays through. . . "
(see Grant, p. 80).
6.
Alexander has given comprehensive treatment to what he
calls the "Pepper-Croce Thesis"; see the introduction to
John Dew e v 's Theory of Art. Experience, and Nature:
The
Horizons of Feeling; also see chapter two.
Pepper
pronounced Art as Experience organistic and argued that an
"organistic esthetics cannot be harmonized with a pragmatic
esthetics" (see "Some Questions on D e w e y 's Esthetics," p.
372).
Others called Art as Experience "romantic"
(Campbell, p. 85); "idealistic" (Piatt 108; Kazin 143) and
"organicist (Campbell 85; Jeannot 267).
D. C. Phillips
believes D e w e y 's philosophy has all the characteristics of
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the five components he names as essential to organicism.
Although he does not associate D e w e y 's organicism with
Romantic literature (he believes evolutionary biology and
Hegel were sources), he does maintain that organicism is
D ew e y 's "root metaphor" (see Phillips' "John Dewey and the
Organismic Archetyp e ," pp. 232-271).
7.
Kieran Egan's 1990 study, Romantic Understanding: The
Development of Rationality and Imagination. Ages 8 - 1 5 . is
suggestive of Cass's use of Emerson as a reconciler of
intuitive and cognitive ways of knowing.
Though Egan
revises turn-of-the-century recapitulation t h e o r y , his
models are the British Romantics and Alfred North
Whitehead. Representing "modern educational thought at its
best as merely footnotes to Wordsworth" (286), Egan calls
on a Romantic model for reconciling knowledge accumulation
and psychological development.
Egan views the Romantic
achievement as being one of "discovering a key to harmony
and balance in our cultural lives" (82).
See also Harriet
Scott's recapitulation theory of curriculum in Organic
Education (1899).
Scott's new curriculum is described as
having "branches of study" springing "from the same trunk
(p. 8).
8.
What constitutes "process" rhetoric is currently
being debated in research discourse.
Its opposite is
product-oriented pedagogy, often described as
"currenttraditional." Generally, process theorists describe
writing as a process of discovery.
Andrea Lunsford and Robert Connors (The St. Martin's
Handbook) define process writing as "seamless and
recursive, meaning that its goals or parts are constantly
flowing into and influencing one another, without any clear
break between them" (p. 2).
Lunsford and Con n o r s , as do
many process theorists, disdain clearly defined prewriting,
writing, revising "steps," saying that writing, instead,
takes place "simultaneously, in a kind of spiraling
sequence" of "exploring, drafting, and revising all taking
place throughout the process of writing" (p. 2).
Though process theorists Maxine Hairston and John
Ruszkiewicz advise students not to think of the final
product, they, unlike Lunsford and Connors, do envision
steps and stages, advising students of the "smaller steps
you can take to pull off that finished p r o d u c t ," for
"writing. . . is a process that moves through s t a g e s ."
Their "process menu" includes preparing, planning,
drafting, incubating, revising, editing, and proofreading
(The Scott. Foresman Handbook for W r i t e r s , p. 5).
The historiographer of two NCTE-published studies of
rhetoric, James Berlin has outlined two major schools of
twentieth-century process composition:
subjective

and transactional.
According to Berlin, subjective
rhetoric— represented by expressionism-— locates reality
within the individual and transactional— -represented by
classical, cognitive, and epistemic pedagogies— locates
reality in the transaction between the observer and the
observed (between the private and the social); see Rhetoric
and Reality:
Writing Instruction in American C o l l e g es .
1900-1985. pp. 145-179.

9.
These designations oscillate, both with writers
themselves declaring an alteration in theory or with
critics contending among themselves as to the correctness
of a classification.
In Rhetoric and Reality Berlin says
Bartholomae "has recently moved firmly into the ranks of
the epistemic category" (p. 185).
10.
Bob Morgan calls the kind of plea Wiley makes to "get
beyond words" the "bleached language" or "correspondence"
theory of language. Language is transparent: it "conveys
the presence of the world to u s " ; there is "a one-to-one
correspondence between the objects in the world, the words
in a language, and the concepts in our heads" ("Three
Dreams of Language; Or, No Longer Immured in the Bastille
of the Humanist W o r d ," p. 450).
11.
The transactional has at its theoretical base the
importance of writing as a transaction between the writer
and his or her social environment, between the private and
the public.
Berlin says expressionists ground their theory
in private discovery; for them, he says, reality is "a
personal and private construction" (p. 145).
12.
I do not wish to misconstrue the Berlin position.
In
his later volume on the history of twentieth-century
composition, he speaks of language not being a "simple sign
system" and of language "being the very condition that
makes thought possible" (p. 48).
However, in his
characterization of Emerson, Berlin adopts an organicist
position; in other parts of this earlier text, he also
endorses the use of organic metaphors to describe the
composing process (p. 83).
13.
See Morse Peckham, The Triumph of Romanticism:
Collected Essa y s , pp. 12-13; see also Peter L. Thorslev,
Romantic Contraries;
Freedom and D e s t i n y , p. 85.
Peckham reduces the three components A. J. Lovejoy and
Wellek have defined as "Romantic" to one— organicism— and
Thorslev says organicism is Romanticism's "most
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distinctive" hallmark.
These writers, of course, fall
into the pattern of traditional Romantic criticism.

CHAPTER 3
THE LANGUAGE OF REFORM
In reform tracts of the twentieth century, educators
have attempted to mend division,

separation, and alienation

with wholeness, connection, and integration; in expressing
the division, theorists have used mechanistic metaphors
which associate educational problems with technology,
construction, production, and confinement; in proposing
reform, they have used organic metaphors which symbolically
identify their reform with n a t u r e .

While the idea of the

whole as being especially desirable is as old as thought1
and the valuing of the thing "grown" over the thing "made"
(Williams 37) is a distinction which Leo Marx says
permeates American thought (229), organicism is
mystification which fails to mend irreconcilable divisions
or to ameliorate genuine problems in education.
Paul de Man believes the alienation that the
nineteenth Romantics experienced is inescapable and that
any attempt at reconciling subject and object is
impossible.

According to de Man and Geoffrey H a r t m a n , the

New Critics, who criticized the Romantics for their
subjectiveness, were equally alienated and equally
incapable of "escaping this inwardness"

50

(Waters 1).

If, as de Man has argued, self-consciousness— made possible
by language— is inescapably accompanied by the reality of
separation, then our own time, no less than that of the
nineteenth century, is destined to be inwardly
contemplative of that separation.

De Man believes an

awareness of this alienation is marked in Romantic texts by
allegorical difference, not symbolic identification.

The

allegory, de Man says, arises out of a recognition of time
and mortality, and it "takes place in a subject that has
sought refuge against the impact of time in a natural world
to which,

in t r u t h , it bears no resemblance"

(RT 190).

When educators represent solutions to divisions within
education with organic metaphors, they are— unlike the
Romantics— expressing symbolic identification instead of
allegorical difference.

De Man maintains that when the

Romantics do engage in symbolic identification, they are
engaged in a "defensive strategy" in their attempt "to
hide" from their knowledge of an irreparable division
between nature and self.

This symbolic identification is

not, according to de Man, the main Romantic experience.
However, when it appears in Romantic t e x t s , it represents
what he terms "tenacious self-mystification"

(RT 191).

I

believe educators engage in the same mystification when
they wrap their proposed reforms in the plant, the stream,
the horizon, or in the "black earth of freedom"
Child 314).

(Rugg,

The use of organic metaphors to remedy educational
dualisms is apparent in the Progressive rhetoric of Dewey,
Rugg, and Pra t t ; it continues through mid-century in
Goodman's and Illich's work, and it currently marks
Willinsky's theories of language arts education.
the organicism acknowledge?

What does

Does it recognize the

inescapable reality of division?

De Man suggests that the

fact that the integration must be accomplished "within the
medium of language" reflects "that it does not exist in
actuality"

(IS 8).

How, then, do educators regard

language?

Because of his importance and because of his

expansion of his own philosophy of language and meaning,
John Dewey's symbolic theory of language will, I believe,
demonstrate a foundation for the use of organic and
mechanistic metaphors in reform rhetoric.

Dewey's Language:

"Bullion in the Vaults"

Emerson's longing for the stability

of the natural

object is expressed metaphorically in a May
journal ent r y :

"As a plant in the earth

I am only a form of him.

He is the soul

26, 1837,

so I grow in God.
of me" (62).

However, allegorical difference— which de Man has shown to
be stronger than symbolic identification in the work of the
Romantics— takes over in the remainder of the journal
entry:
Yet why not always so? How came the Individual,
thus armed and impassioned, to parricide thus
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murderously inclined, ever to traverse and kill
the Divine Life? Ah, wicked M a n i c h e e ! Into that
dim problem I cannot e n t e r . A believer in Unity,
a seer of Unity, I yet behold two.
This particular journal entry demonstrates both
longing and realization— a wistfulness but a knowing
b e tter.

Emerson's realization arises out of his awareness

of "the inadequacy of language"
subject and object.

(Kronick 24) to reconcile

Metaphoric reconciliation— Emerson's

becoming a plant in the earth---represents only the longing.
In Nature Emerson demonstrates this awareness when he s a y s ,
"Words are finite organs of the infinite mind.
cover the dimension of what is in t r u t h .
and impoverish it"

(41).

They cannot

They break, chop,

The difference between Emerson's

recognition of the inadequacy of language to heal divisions
and D e w e y 's use of metaphor to reconcile them is best
demonstrated in their attitudes toward language.

In Nature

Emerson speaks of the inability of words to stand for
things:
The corruption of man is followed by the
corruption of language. . . . and old words are
perverted to stand for things which are not; a
paper currency is employed, when there is no
bullion in the v a u l t s . In due time the fraud is
manifest, and words lose all power to stimulate
the understanding or the affections. . . . (33)
Dewey views language instrumenta1l y :
tool of tools"

(EN 186).

as a tool— "the

Like Emerson, he employs money as

a metaphor in attempting to explain the connection between
signified and signifier, but Dewey believes words are

backed by what Emerson recognizes as missing:

"bullion in

the v a ults":
Words are spoken of as coins and money.
Now
gold, silver, and instrumentalities of credit are
first of all, prior to being money, physical
things with their own immediate and final
qualities.
But as money they are substitutes,
representations, and surrogates, which embody
relationships. (EN 173)
W o r d s , then, are substitutions for "physical things with
their own immediate and final qualities"; they "embody
relationships."
of exhange:

Dewey thinks of language as an implement

money (and, by implication,

"facilitates exchange"

(EN 173).

language)

Like the New Critics,

Dewey looks on language as transparent, as symbolically
connecting word with thing, as leading to communication and
shared meaning:
The meaning of signs moreover always includes
something common between persons and an object.
When we attribute meaning to the speaker as his
intent, we take for granted another person who is
to share in the execution of the intent. . . .
Persons and things must alike serve as means in a
c o m m o n . shared consequence [my e mphasis]. (EN
185)
Dewey's emphasis on the capacity of language to effect
shared communication and to culminate in shared meaning is
yet another example of organicism's metaphysical base— an
example of Desilet's "hermeneutic communication"
of Mailloux's "hermeneutic idealism"

(156) and

(qtd. in Desilet 174).

Dew e y 's community of language users and his assumption of
shared meaning satisfies Desilet's definition of
hermeneutic communication:

". . . it assumes
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communication, as the sharing of meaning,

to be pervasive

in the use of language”— a choice that "privileges the
sameness of intersubjectivity in the self/other relation
. . . [my emphasis]” (153).

This emphasis on language as

shared communication is the same emphasis James Berlin's
transactional theory of writing supports.

Both Berlin and

Dewey metaphysically privilege the collective in the
collective/individual hierarchical opposition.
Dewey says ” . . .
universal.

every meaning is generic or

It is something common between speaker, hearer

and the thing to which speech refers” (EN 187).

Using

Hegel's explanation of the Hie and Nunc in the
Phenomenology. Joseph Kronick addresses the impossibility
of a particular, concrete, ”self-maintaining N o w ” ; for "Now
is always universal and mediated, not immediate” :
The self-maintaining Now exists only in language.
The Now only maintains itself by the existence of
its negation; therefore, the No w can never be a
particular Now, but must be u n i v e r s a l , for a
universal alone is neither this nor that and is
either this or that.
And whenever we say "This,"
it is always the universal " T h i s ."
(56-57)
Kronick concludes that ". . . we are left with w o r d s , which
are universal and never concrete"
language, however,

(57).

Dewey's theory of

focuses on its functional capacities and

on its users' facile substitution and manipulation of
symbols.

Thomas Alexander has said that in D e w e y 's

thinking
[1]anguage is the most efficient and creative of
the symbol systems invented, for it readily
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passes from one user to another and back.
At one
moment I can be the "I" and at the next moment
the "you" or the "he," and I have no difficulty
sorting these out or placing them t o g e t h e r . I
became your "you" and someone's " h e ." The
identity here is functional. . . . To be involved
in communication, then, is for there to be an
interplay not only between various parties, but
between the pres e n t , past, and the fut u r e . (163)
This interplay or negotiation between speakers and writers
and among present, past, and future results in D e w e y 's idea
of communication, in his belief in a "consensus of action,"
which "brings with it the sense of sharing and merging in a
whole"

(EN 184).

In D e w e y 's view, meanings become generic

and common and are readily acknowledged by a community of
users who are thereby unified in a "consensus of action."
Meaning, he says,

is not "adventitious and arbitrary."

A

word becomes a word "by gaining m e a n i n g ; and it gains
meaning when it establishes a genuine community of action"
(EN 184-85).
D e w e y , however, ignores the inability of language to
point to a particular "now," and he is forced back on the
"naive empiricism-idealism" Catherine Belsey has seen in
the New Critics, who argued that "words stand either for
things or for experiences, and that these inhere timelessly
in the phenomenal world or in the continuity of essential
human nature"

(18-19).

Alexander has spoken of Dewey's attempts to use a word
like "experience" in a new way; he says Dewey "wanted his
philosophy to transform the culture itself and so he
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attempted to co-opt its language"

(xii), but Alexander

points out how critics were unable to grasp D e w e y 's new
meaning.

Dewey's difficulty in making a word like

"experience" signify newly demonstrates the problem that a
correspondence or transparent theory of language pres e n t s ,
for transparency implies a clear and easy transmission— an
implication that ignores the difficulty of translation and
the materiality of language.
In a study of Dewey's growth m e t a p h o r , Joe Green says
Dewey "was adamant in the belief that the role of language
should be the transmission of meaning"

(357); Green tells

of how Dewey wrote Arthur F. Bentley about the "necessity
of such a definite language symbol-behavior that,

if the

word is used, there will be no doubt as to what it
designates . . . "

(qtd. in Green 357).

His belief in

"definite language symbo1-behavior" apparently contradicts
Dewey's own attempt to use a word like "experience" in a
special way— an attempt that seemingly endorses the idea
that meaning in language is arbitrary— *a position
antithetical to the one Dewey customarily a dvocated.
Characteristically, Dewey adheres to a symbolic theory of
language and argues for a connection between signifier and
signified or between language and n a t u r e .
A symbolic theory of language-— such as that held by
Dewey--undergirds the use by educators of organic
metaphors, a symbolic theory that is further elucidated
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when he calls a symbol "a direct vehicle, a concrete
embodiment, a vital incarnation"

(EN 82).

What follows is

the history of two m etaphors, a characteristic binary
opposition repeatedly employed by organic educators who
privilege the natural of their reform over the mechanical
of the status quo.

Mechanistic M etapho r s :

Separation and Alienation

The m o t o r , the body, and then the wheel
Are put on by men who do not feel.
They stand at their jobs from twelve to ten;
They are grimy, oily, mechanical men.
Some turn a screw, some paint it tan,
Each part done by the one same man.
The chain of cars rolls on its way-—
They are cars that are made in half a day.
(qtd. in Pratt 129)
I have quoted part of a poem titled "Machines" written
by Caroline Pratt's thirteen-year-old group after it had
visited a Ford assembly plant in the early 1920s.
young writers,

The

in attempting to deal with the routine labor

at the factory, conclude that the mechanical labor has cut
the men off from meaningful endeavor: "For as they work
there day after day/ Their minds grow stupid, their brains
decay./ They are now only grimy mechanical m e n , / Yes,
grimy, oily, mechanical men"

(129).

just

In the children's

view, the factory work has b o u n d , restrained, and limited
the minds of the wo r k e r s : "minds grow stupid" and "brains
decay."

The reaction of these students is harmonious with

that of Pratt and other Progressives who look on restraint
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of the individual mind as arising from mechanical division.
And what better symbol of division in the early years of
the century than Ford-— the company which wrought the
assembly line?
In reform literature mechanistic metaphors are even
more prevalent than organic m e t a p h o r s .

Suggestive of

division and alienation, the mechanistic metaphor is
perhaps employed most repetitively in the 1960s.

The

earlier Progressive writers illustrate their sense of
separation and alienation again and again with figures of
machines,

factories, construction, and confinement.

Though

attached to various problems of school setting, curriculum,
teacher, and student, the mechanistic metaphor signifies
boundaries,

limits, restraints.

When used

(as it often is)

in tandem with the organic m e t a p h o r , the freedom denied by
mechanism is realized in organic g r o w i n g , blossoming,
flowing.
I have studied the figurative language of three
reformers— John Dewey (Schools of T o - M o r r o w . 191 5 ) ,2
Caroline Pratt (I Learn from Chil d r e n . 1948), and Harold
Rugg (The Child-Centered Scho o l . 1928).

I chose these

specific works because they deal with the establishing of
Progressive schools, they reflect early dreams and goals,
and they represent the strong years of the movement
(Pratt's book, though published in 1948, retraces a career
which began in 1914).

In these three Progressive texts,
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the machine generally represents impersonality,
standardization, and deadening routine.

In Schools of To-

Morrow . Dewey complains of the "school machinery" and its
methodical, mechanical pace:

It "works on at the same

rate, regardless of any individual pupil or study,"
resulting in the student's conclusion that "his own efforts
are not important"

(190).

Dewey later laments the division

of the curriculum from actual social life and surmises that
workers unschooled in the social and physical facts behind
the machines with which they work will become victims of
the machines, will b e c o m e , in D e w e y 's w o r d s , "blind cogs
and pinions"

(246).

Like D e w e y , Rugg also complains of the school
machinery.

He believes theater has been excluded from the

traditional curriculum because teachers had resented its
interruption of the "smooth running machine of school
classes"

(267); the old education, Rugg a r g u e s , was life-

denying,

"crushing out life it purported to nourish," while

"originality,

initiative,

individuality" are being "fed

into revolving rollers, to be flattened into conformity,
standardized"

(293).

In R u g g 's assessment, the teacher too

has become machine-like; the "mechanic-teacher" has become
the product of a system "she helps to p e r p e t u a t e ."

She is

"a blind, helpless cog in the great machine of enforced
mass education"

(323). Rugg's mechanic-teacher has

memorized her subject m a t t e r , has marked her b o o k s , has
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"her eye on the answer," but she is divorced from "growth
. . . and the psychology of mental and emotional life"
(322).

He argues that progressive education offers freedom

to the teacher as well as to the stud e n t :

the "artisan-

teacher" will be encouraged to be original and
individualistic— to be a "guide," not a "taskmaster" or "a
kind of section boss for the huge railroading system known
as school"

(322) .

The attitude of P r a t t 's thirteen-year-old students
toward the "grimy, oily, mechanical men" mirrors the
aversion of their t e a c h e r .

Looking back on her own

childhood, Pratt contrasts that world— "a wide wonderful
place"— with the confinement of the lives of her students,
whose world has become "a narrow cell, walled about with
mysteries of complex machinery"

(xv).

As Dewey and Rugg

had complained of the lack of freedom in the old
curriculum, Pratt says the old curriculum has resulted in
students' lack of interest, curiosity,

initiative,

and

imagination, making it appear that the students had been
"turned out by a factory"

(5).

Akin to the machine and factory metaphors is the pump
metaphor used by both Dewey and Rugg to describe the
teacher-student relationship.

In D e w e y 's mind the

reservoir and pump represent the traditional idea of
teacher as a reservoir of information with the student as a
pump to suction out and passively receive the information.
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He calls for a curriculum to abolish this mechanical
relationship (87).

Rugg suggests the teacher become

something more than a "force pump"

(229).

Indicative of restraint in Progressive rhetoric are
metaphors of confinement:
lids, shells.

cells, prison, walls, y o k e s ,

Dewey pictures the traditional school that

fetters students:
Instead of providing this chance for growth and
discovery, the ordinary school impresses the
little one into a narrow area, into a melancholy
silence, into a forced attitude of mind and body,
till his curiosity is dulled into surprise at the
strange things happening to him.
Very soon his
body is tired of his task and he begins to find
ways of evading his teacher, to look about him
for an escape from his little prison.
(20)
In R u g g ’s work,

students of traditional education are

said to be "pigeonholed" in "long rows of d e s k s , filed in
stereotyped classrooms as alike as the cabinets in which
the methodical principals preserve their records"
they suffer from a day
segments” (73) .

(2), or

"pigeonholed" into "strict timed

He makes a plea for the "lid" to be taken

off students so that they might build up attitudes of selfexpression (180); this he later repeats when he asks that
the lid be taken off to let the child reveal his "genuine
self"

(235). In speaking of the confinement of students in

traditional schools, he charges that the "rigid desks,
desks in rows” were there "to prison youth while education
laid its heavy yoke upon them” (302-03).
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Pratt too employs confinement metaphors.
world has become a cell (xv).
formal schools was "fixed,

The curriculum of the old

immovable"

experimental school, however,

The child's

(137); her

frees both student and

teacher from this "straitjacket" curriculum, allowing for
the "group's interest, the events that were the talk of the
dinner table at night or the headlines of the morning
paper" to guide the curriculum (139).

Looking on the

traditional school as a "curious confinement" for children,
Pratt wonders why friendliness in the classroom has been
considered "a disturbance"

(166).

Moreover, the three Progressive reformers condemn
those who confine and bind.

Dewey calls the traditional

teacher a "cicerone and dictator" instead of a "watcher and
helper."

And Rugg speaks of "the old regime"

(125), the

college and administrative "rulers" of the schools, the
"reign" of college entrance requirements, the "regime" of
"education-as-discipline"
teacher"

(267).

(245), and the "autocratic

Pra t t 's advocacy of educational liberty is

opposed to a teacher behaving "like a classroom H i t l e r " :
If we were preparing our children to live under
an autocratic regime I could understand the need
for iron discipline. . . . But we are preparing
our children to be responsible citizens in a
democracy. . . . Why then the screwed-down
benches, the interdiction on speech, the marching
through the halls in silent single file, the
injunction on the teacher to behave like a
classroom Hitler? (167)

Though Lawrence Cremin speaks of the death of
Progressivism in 1955

(vii), the 1960s deschooling movement

picked up on and intensified the mechanistic metaphors the
Progressives had used.3

There is, however, an alteration.

Among educational intellectuals like Paul Goodman, the
metaphor is no longer based on a grimy assembly-line
worker.

For thinkers like Goodman and Ivan Illich, minds

can grow stupid and brains decay as easily from the
impersonality and routine of the Ford board room as from
its assembly line.

Both Goodman and Illich record the

mechanization that results from the mating of education and
business. As a remedy for the resulting division, Goodman
recommends that young people secure their best education by
quitting college (48) or by not going to classes at all
(138); Illich promotes "deschooling."
Both Goodman, whose The Community of Scholars

(1962)

focuses on postsecondary education, and Illich, whose
Deschoolinq Society (1970) gave a name to a movement that
proposed the elimination of education as it was known at
the time,

identify fragmentation with metaphors that

duplicate Progressive images of machines and confinement.
Each wants to remove boundaries,

limits, restraints; to do

so, they propose radical changes in American education.
The refrain appearing in each writer's work is that of
standardization and impersonality as represented by the
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"educational machine"

(Illich 48).

Goodman says the

university is
really a machine for its own sake [which] r u n [s ]
and produce[s] brand goods for selling and
buying. . . . More revolutionary products like
free spirit, individual identity, vocation,
community. . . are, rather, disapproved.
But
frictionless and rapid running is estee m e d ; and
by clever co-ordination of the moving parts, and
lots of money as lubrication, it can be
maximized. (63)
The problem, Goodman maintains,

is the business machine

that runs American colle g e s ; this machine isolates and
alienates what should be a "community of scholars," related
one to the oth e r , to knowledge, and to life.

Instead, the

business mentality of the administration looks on school
"as a teaching machine to train the young by predigested
programs in order to get pre-ordained marketable skills"
(8).

According to Goodman, the community of scholars has

been replaced by a community of administrators

(74).

He

thinks colleges are run like banks and have become
"factory-like"; they "do not encourage communities and
differentiation" but "behave like department stores opening
new departments and sometimes branc h e s , and increasing
efficiency by standardizing the merchandise and the sales
force"

(76).

impersonal,

The style of the administration "is
like any machine"

(80).

And walls, he

concludes, separate the university from the rest of society
(5).

In G o odman's view, the administrative machine is

66
incapable of reuniting teachers, students,

studies in a

community of scholars.
Illich sees a similar educational machine.
Goodman,

And like

Illich looks back to incidental learning of

medieval villages

(33) ; but modern education, he laments,

is a business:
School sells curriculum— -a bundle of goods made
according to the same process and having the same
structure as other merchandise.
Curriculum
production for most schools begins with allegedly
scientific research, on whose basis educational
engineers predict future demand and tools for the
assembly line, within the limits set by budgets
and t a b o o s . The distributor-teacher delivers the
finished product to the consumer-pupil. . . .
(59)
Illich and Goodman find the mechanization of administration
bringing about a concomitant mechanization of t e a c h e r ,
curriculum, and student; repeatedly the two mourn the loss
of spontaneity:

Illich draws consumption as preventing us

from being "spontaneous,
other"

(76).

independent" or "related to each

Spontaneity and relation— qualities which are

not reflected in the machine— -are characteristics
organicists frequently value.4
The machine image is the overarching metaphor in
Illich's book, and the self-sealing casket is his ultimate
machine:
Our society resembles the ultimate machine which
I once saw in a New York toy shop.
It was a
metal casket which, when you touched a switch,
snapped open to reveal a mechanical hand.
Chromed fingers reached out for the lid, pulled
it down, and locked it from the inside.
It was a
box; you expected to be able to take something
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out of it; yet all it contained was a mechanism
for closing the c o v e r . (151)
The 1960s reform rhetoric of Goodman and Illich underscores
the lack of connection and the absence of community in
American education.

The two reformers anticipate being

able to find a meaningful w h o l e ; instead, Illich's
"ultimate machine" reveals only "a mechanism for closing
the cover. "5
John Willinsky, who says the "seeds" of his New
Literacy were planted during the 1960s reawakening of
progressive education, subscribes to the process theory of
writing.

Willinsky,

as well as oth e r s , gives Gordon Rohman

and Albert Wlecke,6 two Michigan State University
researchers, credit for initiating pre-writing in process
writing pedagogy.

Rohman and Wlecke's work,

like that of

Willinsky, endorses expressionistic writing— an approach
with goals opposed to those of objective or productoriented current-traditional schools of composition.

As

had Goodman and Illich, Rohman and Wlecke use metaphors of
the machine to describe division in the composing process.
With their emphasis on the writing process as discovery,
they find objective rhetoric's concern with "methods,
tradition, conditioning, grammar, and the like" to fall
short of a "fresh perspective"; indeed, they believe
objective approaches have a kind of machine deadliness
about them:

" . . .

such approaches can be positively

harmful by reducing writing and writers to 'things' on
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machine analogies"

(23) .

Rohman and Wlecke believe that

though they live in an "age dominated by machine
analogies," the writing process should be "more like a
growing process than a mechanical one"

(20).

Their research, actually a government-sponsored 1964
study, was conducted at Michigan State University with both
experimental and traditional classes of students.

A

colleague who aided in the evaluation of the two g r o u p s '
work found the essays of the traditional classes to be
marked "with the dead level tone of the hum of an assembly
line, for there is no personality involved in t h e m ."

A

machine, he determines, could turn out work with such
"robot-like results," the machine metaphor indicating the
impersonality resulting from a division of thought from
process.

The consequences are once again a kind of death
like that of rusted car-bodies in a junk yard
waiting to be further corrupted by rust as they
wait to be smashed into squares of mere iron to
be lifted by a mechanical magnet into a truck to
be carried to a smelter to be made into reclaimed
iron to be made into objects on an assembly line.
(140)

Willinsky says that those who work from an "organic
conception of the mind" are reluctant "to conceive of the
mind as a machine, or of language and learning as
mechanical processes"

("Seldom" 268-69).

In fact,

Willinsky credits the Romantics with supplying him with the
two metaphors of the New Literacy:
garden ("Seldom" 271).

the machine and the

Believing authoritarian educators
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and too great an emphasis on the book to have detrimental
effects on literacy, Willinsky cautions against
transforming the child "from a flower to an engine, all for
want of the accidental and spontaneous"

("Seldom" 276).

Two other process theorists whom Willinsky cites and
whom he calls "Neo-Romantics"
Knoblauch and Lil Brannon.

("Seldom" 277) are C. H.

Berlin believes Knoblauch and

Brannon more expressionistic than the epistemic label they
claim (RR 185); howe v e r , as with other process theorists,
they disdain the dividing of composing into p a r t s .

While

the early work of Rohman and Wlecke defined a pre-writing
step, Knoblauch and Brannon are firmly opposed to steps or
parts divisions:

"The parts of an automobile engine

precede the engine viewed as a whole; but the parts of a
plant, stem, leaves, roots do not precede
whole"

the plant as a

(84-85).

Berlin finds an early ancestor of process theory in
the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century work of Fred
Newton Scott, whose organic and epistemic theories of
composition Berlin himself endorses.

He draws a distinct

line between Scott's organic

metaphor-driven theory and the

machine metaphors he uses to

characterize objective

rhetoric.

The objective rhetoric that Scott opposes

sanctions,

in Berlin's w o r d s , a "mechanistic view of the

mind as container or muscle"

(WI 79-80); the essential

difference between process and objective

(current-
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traditional)

rhetorics can be gauged, according to Berlin,

by the metaphors that ground each t h e o r y :

current-

traditional composition "is governed by the image of the
m a chine"; the metaphor guiding S c o t t 's early epistemic
theory is that of the plant, the essay being "regarded not
as a dead form, to be analyzed into its component parts,
but as a living product of an active, creative mind"

(WI

83-84).

Organic Metaphors:

"A Fine Flowering"

A discontinuity between language and nature
prevents the reader from ever making contact with
n a ture. To experience n a t u r e , we must interpret
it, which means we must violate it by inscribing
man and nature in the text of culture.
The
search for nature leads into the pit of m e t a p h o r .
(Kronick 24)
The use of the organic metaphor follows the Romantics'
voice of symbolic union and longing, a voice de Man
believes uncharacteristic of the principal Romantic
experience.

Revisionist scholarship has shown the

Romantics' own realization that identification with nature
emanates from human consciousness and the Romantic
recognition that any such coupling is accomplished through
the imposition of the writer's will, not through an
identification of some sort of inherent natural unity.
The organic metaphor,

like the mechanistic m e t a p h o r ,

is, then, an identity established through language.

The

two metaphors are another form of the binary opposition
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represented by the terms "nature" and "culture."

Sharon

Crowley has seen this sort of hierarchical opposition as
indicative of the metaphysics of presence.

Other binaries

that Crowley names include mind/body, presence/absence,
theory/practice, reality/appearance,

content/f o r m , literal/

figurative, and so on (12); these, she says, result in our
privileging one term in the pair (such as the first term in
the pairs just identified)

over the other "as a way of

acknowledging, and yet denying, the movement of
differance."7

Crowley thinks these binaries have long

marked American education (for example, the separation of
thought or content from language or form)

(12).

Metaphysical thought in education, then, favors nature over
culture when privileging the plant over the m a c h i n e .
J. Hillis Miller has examined pedagogical metaphors in
George Eliot's Mill on the F l o s s .

He explains how Eliot

offers one educational metaphor after a n o t h e r :

the

students's mind as ”a field to be plowed and harrowed by
grammar and g e ometr y ; teaching as 'instilling' information;
mind as an intellectual stomach; mind as a blank sheet of
paper; mind as a mi r r o r ” (45-46).
posits,

The problem, Miller

is that "each metaphorically based t h e o r y . . . has

its own built-in fallacious bias and leads to its own
special form of catastrophe in the classroom"

(48).

Just

as a mind is not a field or a blank sheet or a stom a c h , a
student is neither machine nor plant.
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Nonetheless, three Progressive educators— Dewey, Rugg,
and Pratt-— all identify their reforms with n a t u r e :

Dewey

speaks of students continuing the curiosity of their p r e 
school years by "following the path of natural growth
(Schools 21); Rugg says creativity should slowly "blossom"
(Child 253); and Pratt speaks of students who throw out
"roots"

(130) and who "wither"

subjects in bits and pieces.

(82) if required to learn
But students and curriculum

are not plants; what Miller refers to as a "fallacious
bias" exists in these organic metaphors that attempt to
identify with nature what educators consider positive.
"An image of
simplest and most

this t y p e ," says de

Man,

"is indeed the

fundamental we can conceive of, the

metaphorical expression most apt to gain our immediate
acquiescence"

(IS

7).

Why do we want students to follow

the path of "natural g r o w t h ,"

and why do we ask for

creativity to "blossom" in the classroom?

De Man says we

are nostalgic for the origin of the natural object— the
flowers which the Progressive educators employ as growing,
sending out roots, and blossoming— the natural object which
seems "to

have no beginning and no end" (IS 4).

human being, unlike plants,

But a

does lead a temporal existence

with knowledge of his or her mortality.

De Man explains:

The obviously desirable sensory aspects of the
flower express the ambivalent aspiration toward a
forgotten presence that gave rise to the image,
for it is in experiencing the material presence
of the particular flower that the desire arises
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to be reborn in the manner of the natural
creation. (IS 6)
In the three periods of American education I surveyed
— Progressive, mid-century, and late-century reform
movements— organic metaphors with their "obviously
desirable sensory aspects" and their metaphysical base mark
the discourse.

"Growth" is the organic metaphor identified

with Dewey and Progressive reform, but its use is so
pervasive that I have omitted any detailed consideration of
it from my stu d y .

Green's analysis of the metaphor as used

by Dewey in The School and Society, graphs three different
uses of the growth meta p h o r ; howe v e r , he concludes that
Dewey generally binds growth to his concept of democracy
(361) .
Generally, Caroline Pratt does not use "growth" in
defining students' emotional, social, or cognitive
processes; instead,

she uses "living" metaphors and a few

horticultural t r o p e s .

She calls on "growth" metaphors in

references to her school and teachers:
will "grow"
organism"

she says her school

(40) and speaks of it as "a living, growing

(64); at the close of the book, she envisions the

school from the vantage of her old age, but in 1948 the
school,

in Pra t t 's mind,

is still a "living organism, with

a vitality of its own, putting forth new growth"

(181).

With her growth metaphor, Pratt bestows continuity, or as
de Man has pointed out, bestows being "reborn in the manner
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of the natural creation" on her experimental project:

it

will not die; it will continue.
In writing of the teachers needed for her new school,
Pratt demands freedom for her teachers, saying that she
wants them to "grow"

(64).

Here, again,

is a metaphor

appropriating the freedom of a natural object.8

The

Progressives associate their reform with the freedom of
plants— a freedom which they believe divided, machine-like
human beings, curricula, and pedagogy do not possess.
Pratt has failed to consider what Peggy Rosenthal has seen
as the "deterministic implications" of organic meta p h o r s ,
for a plant is essentially programmed for g r o w t h :

"it

simply follows" what are "its inherent laws of
development."

Rosenthal continues,

is thus a poor choice.

"The organic metaphor

. . when we want to assert human

freedom . . ." (79); yet the organic metaphors of Pratt and
other organicist educators suggest the plant as a model of
freedom from restraints, rules,

limits, routine, and

division.
Pratt uses other metaphors related to the growth
metaphor: figures of "living" and horticulture.

Offering

continuity similar to that bestowed in her image of the
school as a growing,

living organism is Pratt's dictum that

education is not an end in itself but something to be
"continued"; education, she says,

is a "living thing"

(14).

Students comprising her six-year-old group are not products
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to be written about in school records but a "living group"
(65). "Like healthy plants," Pratt writes,

"children

absorbed in jobs, throw roots out in every direction from
the jobs to draw in ever more educational nourishment"
(130).

When Pratt's seven-year-old pupils are exposed to a

traditionalist, one who divides reading and writing from
the children's other activities, their lives "withered"
(82).

Like Emerson's rose, which lives above time and is

thus connected to God, the Sevens enjoy what Pratt wishes
us to see as full organic connection:
"roots" thrown out,

absorbed in work,

"nourishment" drawn in.

But when they

are asked to learn in parts— in bits and pieces— subjects
that have been divided into rigid time slots rather than
integrated into their work, the children are deprived of
their sustenance.

With subjects set apart discretely, they

lose their organic wholeness, and the children w i t h e r .
Advocating self-expression, Rugg explains that students
become more confident when teachers themselves model selfexpressive behavior.

Then, he says, students' creativity

slowly "blossomfs]" into "a fine flowering" that can exist
only in "an air of freedom"

(Child 253).

Rugg's organic

metaphor thus asks us to link the plant's freedom with
freedom from restraint in the traditional classroom.
Both Rugg and Pratt use the horizon in metaphors that
treat the curriculum of the new education:
idea of initiating the child in the near

the Progressive

(the child's own
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neighborhood, the city, and the region) before ushering in
things distant.

Pratt explains that she sees the child in

relation to "his own horizons59 and sees "how the circle of
his interest widens outward,
stone thrown into a pond"

like the circles made by a

(8).

Similarly, Rugg uses the

horizon to advance the idea of studying things close first;
for, he writes, the work of later years will "expand the
horizon" to the world at large (93).
The organic metaphors of the Progressives moved into
the 1960s, accompanied by the mechanistic metaphors the
Progressives were so fond o f ; h o w e v e r , both G o o d m a n 's and
Illich's prose has fewer organic than mechanistic
metaphors.

Their organic metap h o r s , h o w e v e r , undergird

their reform proposals.

Good m a n ’s "community of scholars"

is based on organic relations and connections.

He

envisions not walls between the school and society but a
two-way transaction of students "enlivened" by society and
society revitalized by the young leaving the university.
He speaks of the social purposes of such a community of
scholars :

"...

with such purposes, society has its

growth as organically part of itself,
a tree"

like the cambrium of

(52).

Illich's central metaphor is an organic one:
proposes instead of schools is "learning w e b s ."
why he chose "web" instead of "network."

what he
He tells

"Network," he

believes, designates "the channels reserved to material
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selected by others for indoctrination,

instruction,

and

enterta inment" (109-10), and though he wishes to avoid the
connotation of “entrapment89 associated with "web," he
prefers the organic metaphor to the cultural one.
Willinsky's embracing of organic metaphors is
enthusiastic; he believes the mechanistic alternative leads
to positivism— -that is, to what he believes will "measure
and control"— and he says this alternative "may convince
many teachers of the urgency and rightness of the organic
metaphor"

(NL 192).

Willinksy has set up the binary

opposition of organic/mechanical so that one term— the
organic— is privileged over the o t h e r ; the opposition he
draws allows no movement of differance and results in what
Derrida calls the metaphysics of p r e s e n c e .
Saying that he does not wish to "forsake" his
Romantic models, Willinsky draws a parallel between a
student striving for self-expression and an onion:
the writer now faces becoming an onion, as selfexploratory writing is a peeling back of the
layers revealing only other, inner leaves, one
after the oth e r , no truer or more certain than
those on the surface, but more translucent,
slippery. . . . (23)
And Willinsky does not limit his organic metaphors to his
writing theories; he also uses them in exploring his use of
reader-response interpretation:

"Learning to read is

finding a meaningfulness in print that is rooted in
students f experience and grows through students ' experience
in texts that are ends in themselves. . . " (68).

78
His interpretation of the Romantics as organicists is
a misreading which I believe to be grounded in the
traditional way they were interpreted; in fact, both he and
Rohman and Wlecke use M. H. Abrams to supplement their own
interpretations of the Romantics.

Willinsky credits Abrams

with describing the Romantic endorsement of organicism and
their antipathy to mechanism:
If the mechanical view looks to the domain of the
well-tuned machine or flow-chart for its model of
thought, the organic theory turns to the garden,
to fields of living, growing t h i n g s , in which the
self-evolved interdependence of parts is the
secret of life, as Abrams has described it [my
emphasis]. (NL 190)
Rohman and Wlecke's expressionism is anchored in both
A b r a m s 's traditional reading of the Romantics and the
organicism of the New Criticism.

They believe their

prewriting activities will empower students "to search for
a 'seed-idea' out of which an organically coherent essay
might 'grow'"

(41).

The origin of their organic metaphor

is the philosophy of Romanticism,

its best expression they

believe to be articulated in M. H. A b r a m s 's The Mirror and
the Lamp (11).
Rohman and Wlecke's work is a veritable hothouse of
the organic:

meditation in prewriting will, they a r g u e ,

result in something like "creation itself"-— there will be
"growth through moments along a line until a 'flowering' of
concept or idea" occurs (31); analogical thinking in
prewriting will result in what they hope will be a
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"germinatting] discovery"

(38) ; and they caution that the

essay "is not to be seen in external fashion" but should be
regarded by the students as "a developing plant, growing
from within themselves"

(57).

Their Michigan colleagues are told to evaluate the
essays by closely observing the

idea of "form"; that is,

they ask their colleagues to be true to New Critical dicta:
By 'form' we mean something better described in
organic metaphors s a sense of the "growth" of a
"seed idea" or single theme, "exfoliation" of an
argument or proof, "fruition" in the totality of
the essay.
The whole seems a "growing" whole,
not necessarily a static or finished whole.
The
parts serve the whole as an arm the body, the
leaf the p l a n t . (131)
Process theorists Knoblauch and Brannon enlist the
same plant metaphors when they explain the impossibility of
teaching writing:
the ability to use language can— and does— grow,
but it is not consciously learned; it can be
nurtured but it isn't t a u g h t . One enables a
plant to grow by watering its soil, not by paying
elaborate attention to each of its leaves (87).
When educators cast their reform in the bipolar
structure of machine and plant, they privilege the natural
(the leafy plant, the flowing stream, the blooming flower)
over the mechanism (the assembly line, the rusty
automobile, the self-sealing casket).
an easy choice:

life over death.

It beco m e s , in fact,

And though de Man has

shown that natural images are the "simplest and most
fundamental" and are "most apt to gain our immediate
acquiescence," educators who represent their reform as a

reflection of the natural image are not deriving that
organic unity from nature but from the very thing that
separates humankind from nature:
language.

consciousness and
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Notes to Chapter 3
1.
Peggy Rosenthal says that wholism and relation have
always seemed preferable to parts and division:
"it's one
of the ideas that seem inherently good.
And Western
thought has always, or at least since Plato made the One
the highest good, perceived the whole as especially
meaningful and reached for it as the object of knowledge"
(p. 189, Words & Their Values:
Some Leading Words and
Where They Lead U s ) .
2.
Evelyn Dewey is listed as a co-author; however, I will
in future references refer to Dewey as sole author.
It
appears that his daughter fulfilled a research role and
that Dewey wrote the text.
I do not wish to slight the
contribution of Evelyn Dewey; her research role appears to
reflect the subordinate status to which women were
historically assigned, an issue which is not related to my
study.
After initially recognizing both father and
daughter as co-authors of Schools of To-Mo r r o w . Lawrence
Cremin— in his influential study of American progressivism,
The Transformation of the School:
Proqressivism in
American Education:
1876-1957— refers to Dewey as sole
author.
3.
Peter Schrag's 1967 Saturday Review essay, "Education's
Romantic Critics," addresses the linkage between Goodman,
Friedenberg, Holt, and Henry and John Dewey.
Schrag views
alienation as a central concern and the machine as a
metaphor of that alienation.
4.
See Peter Thorslev's analysis of spontaneity as a
characterisitic of organicism (chp. 4 of Romantic
Contraries:
Freedom and Destiny) .
5.
Rena Foy's 1962 study is another reflection of m id
century education's concern with the individual losing
identity and becoming "no more than a cog,
indistinguishable from other cogs, in a machine composed
not of metal parts but of linked and intermeshed human
beings"; she warns of the dangers of the division of labor
and machine technology to education (p. 358, "The
Philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Its Educational
Implications").
6.
Berlin goes further.
He believes Rohman and Wlecke
established the language of process writing.
7.
Kronick explains "differance" as a Derridean neologism
indicating "that the process of signification presupposes
that the sign represents the absent thing for which it
stands. . . the sign differs from the thing and defers or
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postpones the moment we can come into contact with the
thing itself." The thing itself "is never present to
itself (which would require that it be free from language);
it is always related to something other than itself and is
constituted by its relation to this other" (p. 57, American
Poetics of History:
From Emerson to the M o d e r n s ) .
8.
Freedom from authority is the general interpretation
Max Black has given the growth metaphor.
See Scheffler's
The Language of Education, p. 49.

CHAPTER 4
THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION
Educators who use as metaphors for their reform
growing plants, blooming flowers, and flowing streams while
representing traditional education with rusting automobiles
and mind-decaying assembly-line work figuratively allude to
educational life and death.

Perhaps their symbolic

identification of the plant with life and the machine with
death derives from Coleridge.

In 1815 Coleridge wrote

Wordsworth about how Cartesian philosophy had substituted a
machine for a world created by divine fiat:

"a lifeless

Machine whirled about by the dust of its own Grinding.
. . "

.

He proposed to Wordsworth "the substitution of life

and intelligence . . . for the philosophy of mechanism,
which,

in everything that is most worthy of the human

intellect, strikes D e a t h . . . [original emphasis]" (qtd. in
Abrams 169-70).

But if in the nineteenth century the

machine represented division and death to Coleridge, the
machine became in its twentieth-century manifestations even
more representative— at least in educational discourse— of
all that was deadening.

And if educators like D e w e y , Rugg,

Pratt, Illich, and Willinsky were prone to symbolic
identification of their reforms with n a t u r e , they were also
susceptible to casting their theorizing about thinking,
83
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especially creative thinking,

in organic frames.

Often, as

with Dewey's aesthetics and the foundational theories of
compositionists, an acceptance of a symbolic theory of
language is accompanied by a Coleridgean concept of
imagination.
In fact, rhetorician Ann Berthoff argues that
Coleridge's concepts of the symbol and the imagination are
identical:
In one pole of Coleridge's theory of the active
mind is Imagination, at the other we find Symbol:
neither is conceivable without the o t h e r . The
reason for speaking in terms of polarity and
polar oppositions is provided by the Coleridgean
doctrine that oppositions are expressions of one
and the same force.
(58)
She believes, with Coleridge, that "the Imagination creates
in symbols the reality we know.”

This view of the creative

imagination is central to an educational organicism that
gives to the imagination the task of reconciling divisions
and polarities,

"forming and transforming" them.

Organicist educators believe that language "provides the
means by which the mind can act according to its natu r e " ;
this is what Coleridge m e a n s , says Berthoff, when he
repeatedly says that knowledge comes from within

(58).

The reconciling of opposites accomplished through the
imagination and symbolic language is a fundamental
organicist concept.

This is how Berlin characterizes both

his own philosophy and Emerson's:

reality is the

concurrence of subject and object with "language as the
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agent of mediation” (WI 57).

This is Dewey's idea that

human beings are connected to nature through the
imagination— an organ of nature (CF 53)— and symbol— a
"direct vehicle," a "concrete embodiment,” a "vital
incarnation"

(EN 82).

And this is what Willinsky means

when he speaks of process writing as a "clear instance" of
what students' writing can accomplish when guided by the
concept of Coleridge's "blending,
("Seldom" 274).

fusing" imagination

These organic views are not consonant with

Emerson's conviction that language is incapable of
representing reality.

They do not reflect the divisions

the Romantics acknowledge, nor do they reflect the Romantic
imagination.

What these organicist notions do indicate is

de Man's pointed observation that organic reconciliation is
always accomplished through language, a condition which
reveals that the reconciliation does not in actuality take
place

(IS 8).
When organicists examine a creative act, they rely on

natural images to explain how an essay, a poem, or
creative idea "grows."

They speak of natural g r o w t h ,

inner processes, organically developing form, spontaneity,
natural rhythm, the lack of conscious will, and the
resulting organic totality or unity of the creative
p r oduct.

Seldom do they speak of creating an essay or a

poem as an act of conscious deliberation, and to speak of
creating in steps or stages is, by its mechanical nature,
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anathema to them.

In "The Philosophy of Composition," Poe

narrates the anything-but-organic process by which he
constructed "The Raven."

Composition is, Poe argues, not

an act of "fine frenzy" or "ecstatic intuition" but one of
"painful erasures and interpolations"

(364).

According to

Poe, conscious will dictated every step of the process:
. . . no one point in its composition is
referable either to accident or intuition . . .
the work proceeded step by step, to its
completion with the precision and rigid
consequence of a mathematical problem.
(365)
Wimsatt also believes the poem is a "contrived m o m e n t " :
This is so even on the supposition that the
author achieves his sonnet in one perfect first
d r a f t . For he reviews it and accepts it and puts
it out as a poem.
No matter how spontaneous and
lucky in one sense, in another sense it is also
artificial.
(69)
When organicists fail to consider the painful-erasures-kind
of thinking and speak of the student as an onion or the
essay as a germinating seed, they provide not fusion but an
organic metaphor that fails to acknowledge the complexities
of cognition.

By smoothing over differences with

suggestions of organic unity and by looking at creativity
as something already there which requires only an
opportunity for unfolding, they avoid the problem of
reflection.
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Growth Like Roses and Lilies
Coleridge's theory of the imagination is structured
according to the plant-machine antithesis:

the

"mechanical” memory and "passive" fancy as opposed to the
vital imagination that "assimilates," "blends," "fuses,"
and "recreates"

(qtd. in Abrams 168-69).

In following

Coleridge's theory of the organic imagination,

educators

like Dewey and Rugg and compositionists like R o h m a n ,
Wlecke, Willinsky, and Knoblauch and Brannon employ the
same bipolar metaphors:

the creative imagination

represented by the vital growth processes of nature and
objective theories of creativity aligned with mechanism,
rigidity, and deadly formalism.
For example, Dewey terms an act of expression
"mechanical" when it originates solely out of "direct
effort of 'wit and w i l l ' " (AE 73); using K e a t s , he argues
that "reasonings" originate "like that of the movements of
a wild creature toward its goal" and that "they become
spontaneous, 'instinctive,' . . . sensuous and immediate,
poetic"

(AE 33).

To Dewey, Poe's explanation of his

mechanistic construction of "The Raven" indicates only that
the creative acts of some people require greater degrees of
"participation of wit and will" than those of others
74).

(AE

In the work of another Progressive, Harold Rugg, an

imaginative act again is represented as a natural
expression of an internally generated impulse.

Rugg
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describes a person involved in an expressive act as an
"active and self-directed11 organism, not a reactive
automaton controlled bv stimuli from the outside [original
emphasis]98 (Imagination 292).
In the 1960s Rohman and Wlecke, early process
expressionists, told their students to think of the essay
as a "developing plant, growing from within themselves"
from what they called a "seed-idea," one with "sufficient
potency to beget other ideas . . . some of which may have
the p o w e r , like a plant," of assimilating different
elements to the "total organism of the essay"

(57-58).

Rohman and Wlecke abjure regulating creative process by
mechanism:

"...

writing is more like a growing process

than a mechanical one"

(20).

Current theorists like Willinsky and Knoblauch and
Brannon continue this dialectical p a t t e r n .

Maintaining

that the "seeds of the New Literacy were planted during the
1960s reawakening of progressive education"

(19), Willinsky

holds that his organic theories venerate process,

"a

reverence which is not driven like the Enlightenment by a
need to uncover the gearing of its mechanism and the logic
of its engineering" but by Coleridge's conception of the
imagination as "a living faculty"

(190).

Advocates of

students' using language "unself-consciously"

(87), process

theorists Knoblauch and Brannon stress that language use is
not learned.

"The ability to use language," they a r g u e ,
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"can— and does— grow, but it is not consciously learned"
(88).

They refuse to think of the composing act in steps,

stages, and p a r t s :
When discourse is conceived in mechanistic terms, the
parts are primary and the focus is on the ways in
which the parts work together. . . . When discourse is
conceived in organic t e r m s , its plasticity or
continuity is emphasized.
(85)
Dewey's aesthetic beliefs are closely aligned with
both expressionist and transactional rhetorics.

And though

transactionalists like Berlin, Raschke, and Berthoff
believe reality is derived from the interaction of subject,
object, and language— that is, that meaning is derived only
through social and communal efforts— and expressionists
like Rohman and Wlecke and Willinsky rely on a subjective
search for meaning, both streams of process are, in their
organic emphases, metaphysica1ly a r g u e d .
The idea of linking a student's creativity with the
growth processes of a plant was in the Progressive era,

in

the 1960s, and is, in today's process theories, an attempt
to deliver composition from the clutch of an objective or
skills orientation.

This attempt at establishing a more

"natural" relationship between the student and the act of
composing is frequently cast in metaphors that are
illogical and deterministic.

What is disturbing to

Berthoff and other transactionalists, h o w e v e r , is the
solipsism they fear expressionist subjectivism p r o d u c e s .
Ross Winterowd, another transactionalist, believes "growth
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models" render images of a "student communing with himself
or herself"

(xii ) . l

Winterowd's argument with author-

centered, expressionistic models of composition— such as
those of Rugg, Rohman and Wlecke, and Willinsky-— is that
they generate solipsism because meaning is brought about
through isolated self-engagement.

Berthoff— like Berlin,

Raschke, and Winterowd— also fears "creative/expressive/
private use of language"

(67).

Transactionalists are eager

to separate their own process emphasis on the communal
aspects of writing from the individualist emphasis of the
expressionists.

Both expressionists and transactionalists,

ho wever, are prone to link process with natural g r o w t h ,
especially when they,

in a common voice, confront the

"machine" of current-traditiona1i s m .2
What seems at least equally as significant as
transactionalist fears of expressionist solipsism, h o w e v e r ,
is the determinism and faulty logic of the metaphors that
both groups employ.

To both, writing is seen as an

unfolding of something already there, a genetic gift— a
seed planted, needing only the nurturing "facilitating" of
a sympathetic gardener-teacher for growth and blossoming to
occur.

Berthoff says this geneticism is an essential and

necessary characteristic of "natural process, namely, that
what develops is in a sense already there"

(58).

What are the logical implications of representing
knowledge as inherent and learning as an unfolding?

M. H.
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Abrams has questioned the horticultural foundation of
Coleridge's organic imagination:
plant seems inherently purposeful,

"For if the growth of a
it is a purpose without

an alternative, fated in the seed, and evolving into its
final form without the supervention of consciousness
emphasis]" (173).
flawed logic.

[my

William K. Wimsatt has exposed this same

He reveals how Coleridge,

in his assessment

of Shakespeare's dra m a s , does "a double step away" from the
idea that organic form can be accomplished with "vegetable
imagery"

(67).

According to Wimsatt, Coleridge concedes

that Shakespeare's art was a conscious art— that is, he
acknowledges that Shakespeare's dramas did not grow like
plants:

Coleridge says that a "man would be a d r e a m e r , who

otherwise than poetically should speak of roses and lilies
as self-conscious subjects [original emphasis]" (qtd. in
Abrams 173).
Scott Harshbarger has specifically addressed
composition's use of natural images.

Criticizing Berlin

and Knoblauch and Brannon for their tendency to wrap their
theories in green, growing images, he questions whether
"'the plant' ought to be the paradigmatic metaphor for
modern conceptions of the composing process"

(1).

When

theorists couple writers with plants, he says, the idea of
students making conscious decisions "can seem little more
than an interrupt ion of the 'natural process'" (5).
Insofar as process theorists adopt organic metaphors
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because they wish to extricate composition from the grip of
a mechanistic skills model, Harshbarger's words reveal the
irony of such a strategy:

"Thus the possibility of freedom

from external rules which dynamic organicism seems to
promise is bought at the expense of submission to
impersonal forces operating from within . . ." (5).
Creativity tied to Coleridge's plant analogy
eventually must confront the problem Rosenthal, A b r a m s ,
Wimsatt, Harshbarger and others have seen with the organic
metaphor:

the plant is "fated in the seed"

(Abrams 173),

that is, fated to "grow" and develop without conscious
intent, its destiny "inevitable and inexorable"
99).

(Thorslev

Unlike the growing rose or lily, which is genetically

fated to develop inevitably and inexorably,

students'

cognitive endeavors are acts of consciousness.

A student

in the act of composing has what no plant or animal
possesses:
mending"

"a capacity for self-revision, rearrangement,

(Wimsatt 68).

As Wimsatt reminds us,

Plants renew leaves and flowers; animals moult in
several ways; a lobster can lose a claw and
regrow it; the human body heals cuts and regrows
a finger nail.
But there is no action of any
physical organism that remotely approaches the
power of the human mind to revise and recast
itself [original emphasis]. (68)
The product of a creative imagination, then, does not grow
like lilies or r o s e s ; it is an "act of a self-reflexive
consciousness"

(Wimsatt 72).

Are these organic impulses derived from a Romantic
conception of the imagination?

While it is true that

Dewey uses Coleridge, K e a t s , Shelley, Wordsworth and
Emerson in defining creativity, that Berlin refers to
Emerson as the founder of two branches of process
composition, that Rohman and Wlecke use A b r a m s 's
interpretation of Coleridge to develop their pre-writing
experiment, and that Willinsky employs the British
Romantics as a foundation for his writing and reading
assumptions,

I believe these theories— though conceived by

these educators as "Romantic"— -are actually organic.
Coleridge, the most organic of the Romantics,

Even

speaks in

both an organic voice of identification and an allegorical
voice of separation.
De Man has studied Coleridge's voice of separation.
He argues that Abrams reads a passage from Coleridge as
"limiting the task of the mind to interpreting what is
given in nature"— a reading that would indicate that
Coleridge recognizes nature as prior; h o w e v e r , says de Man,
Abrams in the same paragraph uses passages from Coleridge
and Wordsworth that advocate the "self over nature"
182).

(RT

Though Coleridge apparently advocates symbolic

identification between humanity and n a t u r e , critics like de
Man and those who have followed de Man's argument in "The
Rhetoric of Temporality"3 have seen his attitude as much
more tenuous and equivocal.

Other than Coleridge's attempts to distinguish between
the mechanical fancy and the organic imagination, what
comprises the Romantic definition of imagination?

In an

earlier chapter, I spoke of Hart m a n 's argument that the
Romantics do not wish organic union with nature but a
separation from nature so that their imagination might
transcend nature ("Romanticism” 49).

In reading

Wordsworth's The P r e l u d e . Hartman identifies the Romantic
imagination as "growth toward independence of immediate
stimuli"; the mind is thus "a power separate from n a t u r e ,"
a power of the poet to "feel as if by his own c h o i c e . or
from the structure of his mind [my emphasis]
292).

" ("Romance"

If we accept Hart m a n 's interpretation, then, any

educational interpretation of imagination as organically
identified with nature might more appropriately be called
"organic" rather than "Romantic."
Defining theories of creativity as "Romantic" is
difficult because, as Hartman has shown, the Romantics
never conceptua1ized their theories of art and never gave
"an adequate definition of the function of art"
("Romanticism” 50).

Like Hartman, de Man describes the

Romantics' concept of imagination as one not based on
identity with nature but one founded on "a possibility for
consciousness to exist entirely by and for itself,
independently of all relationships with the outside world,
without being moved by an intent aimed at a part of this

world " (IS 16).

The Romantics' recognition of language

and self-consciousness and their belief that art should
issue from a mind independent of nature are ideas that
complicate attempts to call the Romantic theory of
imagination "organic” or, more significantly, complicate
attempts to link educational organicism with Romanticism.

Dewey's Vital Process
The IMAGINATION, then, I consider either as
primary, or secondary.
The primary IMAGINATION I
hold to be the living power and prime agent of
all human perception. . . . The secondary I
consider as an echo of the former, coexisting
with the conscious will, . . . differing only in
d e g r e e . and in the mode of its operation. . . .
it struggles to idealize and to unify.
It is
essentially v i t a l , even as all objects fas
objects) are essentially fixed and dead.
FANCY, on the contrary, has no other
counters to play with but fixities and definites.
The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of
memory . . . . modified by that empirical
phenomenon of the will which we express by the
word CHOICE.
But equally with the ordinary
memory it must receive all its materials ready
made from the law of association [original
emphasis].
(Coleridge 396-97)
I have quoted part of Coleridge's definition of
imagination as he distinguishes it from fancy because
organicist educators tend to follow the Coleridgean
distinction between the vital growth of imaginative process
and the fixed properties of thinking derived from conscious
choices, will, and m e m o r y .

In the twentieth cent u r y , the

idea of thinking as process owes much to D e w e y ; h o w e v e r , it
is process as Dewey defines it aesthetically, not
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instrumentally, that is the subj ect of my s t u d y .

Moreover,

it is the aesthetic proc e s s , as Dewey interprets it in Art
as Experience, that is congenial to organic writing
p edagogies.
The actual pairing of John Dewey with some form of
process writing theory— be it transactional or
expressionistic— has been made by numerous authorities.
George Hillocks associates what he calls "natural process"
writing with Dewey (247); James Kinneavy believes D e w e y 's
theory of art influenced expressionistic composition

(14);

Margaret Mathieson demonstrates that by 1905 D e w e y 's ideas
had influenced the British to convert to an expressionistic
writing emphasis

(58-59); and Berlin's comprehensive

historiographies of rhetoric place Dewey at the beginning
of process writing (RR 46-47; 50-51).4

Process rhetoric,

with Dewey as an antecedent, calls on the process of
writing as a way of creative discovery, the emphasis being
on process and not on p r o d u c t .5
When Dewey's fellow Progressive, Harold Rugg,
published The Child-Centered School in 1948, process
rhetoric in either of its Progressive strands—
transactional

(social emphasis)

and expressionistic

(individual emphasis)-— was essentially active only in the
public schools, the objective philosophy having gained
supremacy in American colleges
passage,

(RR 46).

In the following

fairly typical of a Progressive public school
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emphasis on expression and process, Rugg demonstrates the
organic concern for the "unfolding" of the inner,

"latent,"

and "hidden powers" of students:
. . . we must reiterate that is is not for the
sake of the product that our schools are setting
up a regime of creative effort.
It is for the
sake of educating youth in the creative process
. . . . The result . . . will be measured in
terms of the unfolding of the personalities of
children, not in terms of the painting p r o d u c e d ,
the verse written, the measure composed . . . .
[I]t is the discovery of latent hidden p o w e r s ,
reserves of artistic emotion . . . that is the
true goal of the new education.
The truly
creative act . . . leads to the discovery of new
powers within one's self and brings about a
widespreading sense of release.
(Child 285)
These organic emphases— the unfolding process, the
inner p o w e r s , the reserves of emotion— originate from an
organic notion of imagination.

Thorslev says that

Coleridge couples the primary imagination with creative,
organic, and unconscious powers and links the secondary
imagination with powers which, though conscious, still
treat creativity as being derived from "deeper w e l l s . "
These unconscious or deeper sources, Thorslev surmises,
were contrasted by Coleridge with the fancy, which he saw
as fully conscious but mechanical

(90).

Rugg himself,

h o wever, makes little distinction between Coleridge's
primary imagination and secondary imagination,

saying that

they are "but two phases of one continuous organic process"
which constitutes "the eternal act of creation"
(Imagination 197).
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That Dewey,

like Rugg, organically conceived

creativity is best reflected in his description of an act
of expression as involving "subconscious maturation"
without "direct effort of 'wit and will'"— a process that
involves purposes "below the level of intention" and
results in something "born almost in spite of conscious
personality and certainly not because of its deliberate
will"

(AE 73).

Though I will couple Dewey's ideas of

organic process with theories of rhetoric, Dewey himself
never developed a philosophy specifically tailored to the
act of composing.

Art as Experience, h o w e v e r , is a full

rendering of D e w e y 's concepts of creativity.

In that study

Dewey says that imagination should not be "treated as a
special and self-contained faculty" but should be judged a
"quality that animates and pervades all processes of making
and observation"

(267).

Dewey's aesthetic v i e w s ,6 then,

seem appropriate when searching for the evolution of
organic conceptions that mark specific process discourses.
Alexander deems a "very radical feature" of D e w e y 's
philosophy to be his idea that "experience is not primarily
cognitive," though "knowing may play a significant role"
(185).

When Dewey considers the matter and substance of

the arts, he speaks of the unity of a work of art, saying
that unity can "only be felt," "can only be emotionally
intuited"

(192) and that the "sense of things as belonging

together. . . is immediate"

and "cannot be a product of
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reflection"

(194).

Though he does not say that poetry is

more physical than intellectual, he adds,
than intellectual . . . " (216).

"But it's more

Passages such as these

validate Alexander's assertion that Dewey refused "to
understand the aesthetic as a form of cognitive experience"
(32) .7
While Dewey does not attribute creativity to the
workings of Spirit, he experiences difficulty in
analytically examining creative acts which he believes
emanate from non-cognitive ways of thinking.8

For example,

when Dewey analyzes an expressive act, he speaks of
unconscious intent and the absence of will and surmises
that the creative act is a kind of possession:
The direct effort of "wit and will" of itself
never gave birth to anything that is not
mechanical . . . . Yet as they [different
purposes, acts] all proceed from one living
creature they are somehow bound together below
the level of intention.
They work toget h e r , and
finally something is born almost in spite of
conscious personality, and certainly not because
of its deliberate will.
When practice has done
its perfect work, the man is taken possession of
by the appropriate muse and speaks and sings as
some god dictates.
(AE 73)
Thorslev argues that the organic mind is
. . . not analytic, logical, skeptical, or
self-consciously deliberative. [It] is not the
scientific or the philosophic mind, but an
organic, dynamic mind, a mind forever in motion,
in process.
It is indeed creative, but creative
as is Coleridge's primary imagination, not
consciously or deliberately.
(98-99)
D e w e y 's belief in creative acts as "more than
intellectual," as proceeding "below the level of
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intention," and as being born "almost in spite of conscious
personality" demonstrates an organic concept of
imagination.

When he proposes that will of itself produces

nothing but the mechanical, he endorses Coleridge's idea of
the mechanistic fancy limited by its restriction to will
and conscious choice.
Throughout Art as Experience Dewey alludes to the
rhythms of organic process.

Experience has form because

there is "dynamic organization," because,
is a growth"

(55).

says D e w e y , "it

This dynamism is reflected in the poem

or d r a m a 's "self-movement" (70).

Like the inner-directed

movement of a "live creature," the work of art moves in a
"developing process ," the artist finding "where he is going
because of what he has previously done; that is, the
original excitation.
transformation"

. . undergo[es] successive

(111).

Should energy fail to move in

rhythmic, natural process,

it becomes "inchoate,

mechanical, or loose and diffuse"

(157).

The onward

movement of process should be like the "onward waves of the
sea," not "compelled by outside necessities"

(172).

Closing the Book and Blossoming
"It is consciousness," says Thorslev,

"which splits,

analyzes, distinguishes, and separates us, even alienates
us, from other men and above all from the continuity of
organic nature"

(91); as a result, Thorslev concludes, the
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organicist9 is involved in a retreat from consciousness,
which manifests itself in two ways:

in anti-

intellectualism and in an emphasis on spontaneity and
"naturalness of expression and action, unmediated by
deliberation or conscious judgment"

(93) .

Among those

subjects Thorslev finds most likely to be considered by
organicists as spontaneous and natural are subhuman nature
(animals) and children.
In a passage near the end of the first chapter of Art
as Experience. Dewey reflects on the unified activities of
the fox, the dog, and the thrush whose retention of the
past and whose anticipation of the future give them
"directions in the present"

(19).

Like Emerson's rose and

Whitman's "placid, self-contained animals," D e w e y 's animals
live in the p r esent .

Unlike humankind, the fox, dog, and

thrush do not utilize the past as a model "upon which to
draw" but,
present"

instead, use the "past absorbed into the

(19).

Insofar as Dewey recognizes the separation of selfconscious human beings from unselfconscious nature—
represented in his acknowledgment that "thought withdraws
us from the world"

(19) — -he appears to echo the allegorical

voice of Emerson.

Howe v e r , Dew e y 's organic voice is

dominant:

instead of recognizing the irreparable division

brought about by thought— that is, that the fox's unity can
never be duplicated by human beings— -he sees,

instead, a

102
rhythmic developing.10

From the animals' unified actions,

Dewey concludes that

. experience is heightened

vitality"; it "affords our sole demonstration of a
stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and
developing [my emphasis]" (19).

To a Romantic, D e w e y 's

fox, thrush, and dog— unencumbered by the burden of
thought-— represent a stability human beings cannot hope to
achieve.
But to Dewey, an experience of heightened vitality
replicates the unity of the animals by releasing the human
being from the confines of "one's own private feelings" so
that organic "interpenetration of self and the world"
results

(AE 19).

Dewey thinks,

To one who is fully alive, the fut u r e ,

is not dreaded but holds promise; like the

live creature, a fully alive human being is in process or
is becoming, for "[i ]n a finished world,
could not be distinguished"

(AE 17).

sleep and waking

Experience as

"heightened vitality" demonstrates "active and alert
commerce with the world"
experience and art,

(AE 19)

In D e w e y 's view, then,

like language, release us from isolated

subjectivity and organically connect us to the world.

This

view is, of course, the opposite of the Romantic idea that
language and self-consciousness do, in fact, create the gap
between subject and object.

Dewey elevates literature over

other arts not only because of its capacity for expressing
"meanings to which we had been dumb" but also for its
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greater ability to make common "what has been isolated and
singular,” thereby connecting "the one who utte r s ” to
"those who listen” (AE 244).
Dewey's understanding of experience as "heightened
vitality”-— a vitality which is rhythmic and developing— is
manifested in the expressive act, which,

if not actually

spontaneous, appears to be spontaneous; he draws his model
of this spontaneity from nature and from playing children.
Though Dewey considers language a tool, a "practical
device” (AE 215), he believes that language sometimes falls
short of representing n a t u r e .

At such times experience

itself, he argues, should suffice.

Ever the reconciler,

Dewey concludes that experience does not need
"reduplication in language"

(AE 215).

This privileging of

organic connection, which occurs in experience if not
always in language,

is manifested in D e w e y 's preference for

experience-— such as that demonstrated in the live
creature's organic activities or in the play of children—
over the secondhand experience in b o o k s .11
Spontaneity in an expressive act, Dewey explains,
follows "complete absorption in subject matter" and is not
actually an immediate outburst.

Spontaneity, even though

it may follow long reflection, will be manifested "if . . .
matter has been vitally taken up into a present experience"
(70); he gives two examples of natural spontaneity:

the

rhythmical movement of happy children and the volcano's
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eruption.

Though the volcano's "outburst" looks

spontaneous, Dewey points out that it "presupposes a long
period of prior compression"; significantly, Dewey finds
that this long incubation results in a unified mass of
lava, not in "separate rocks and ashes"
rhythmical movements of children,
the unified actions of animals,

(71).

The

like the mass of lava and

issue from a "union of

something stored from past experience,

something therefore

generalized, with present conditions"; this unison, he
says,

is rarer with "maturer persons. "12

The a d u l t 's

expressive act, how e v e r , "may issue with the spontaneity of
the cadenced speech or rhythmic movement of happy
childhood"

(71-72).

In D e w e y 's aesthetics and in the work of the organic
process theorists, the privileging of the "natural," the
spontaneous, the intuitive, and the internal at times
results in an elevation of the child (and, simultaneously,
in a diminished role for the teacher).

Willinsky's

expressive writing theory is centered on the "child's
unconscious genius which requires only a writerly
opportunity to bring it into play"

(NL 193).

His New

Literacy writing gives primary consideration to the
"experience of children and the natural power of their
minds to find their own w a y " ; once this responsibility has
been shifted from the external authority of the teacher to
the child's own interior, he says,

"...

children can be
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said to be responsible, by this act of writing,
own intellectual stimulation"

(NL 192).

for their

Willinsky's

philosophy recognizes writing as an unfolding of the
student's natural ability.

Though he wishes to emphasize

the social scene of writing,13 he, at the same time, urges
that students be "engaged in figuring things out on an
informal and personal level"
should begin "within"

(NL 42) and that meaning

(NL 46).

With his conceptual

movement of the teacher from a mechanistic to an organic
figuration, Willinsky envisions a writing philosophy that
will stimulate a "flowering of thou g h t " :

"Not only is

writing to come that much easier and more powerfully for
. . . the New Literacy by turning to the organic metaphor,
this writing will serve to awaken and advance the mind"

(NL

192-93).
Knoblauch and Brannon,

like Dewey and Willinsky,

assign the child superior p o w e r s .

They argue that "no

technical virtuosity" is needed to "put the 'pieces' of
language together"; therefore, they believe "no deliberate
learning is required before people are able to respond
grammatically to the world, a fact borne out by simple
observation of the complexly fluent verbal performance of
young children"

(88).

Because they consider these

abilities "natural," Knoblauch and Brannon are perhaps the
most anti-instructional of the organicist rhetoricians.
Insofar as writers "naturally" organize by the modes

utilized in objective rhetorics; that is, they "naturally11
define, compare, classify, and so on, they do not,
according to Knoblauch and Brannon, need textbooks or
teachers.

They argue that it is "the teacher's need to

tell, more than the students' need to know, that motivates
skill-based instruction."

As do many organic process

theorists, Knoblauch and Brannon define the writing
teacher's role as "facilitator," for " [t]eachers can
facilitate maturation of a natural capacity, but they
cannot control growth by means of their pedagogy"
The teacher's role, then,

(94).

is a "peripheral role of

nurturing a competence" and providing a context because
teachers "can't create thinkers and writers after their own
image"

(94).

Because he thinks students should find within
themselves their own method and process, Willinsky insists
that they not follow teachers,

"who do not think enough of

it [the method] to try it themselves"

(NL 45).

Linking his

pedagogy to Illich and 1960s deschooling, Willinsky wishes
a teacher's learning to "circulate" authority throughout
the class "rather than lord it over them"

(NL 52).

He

describes a New Literacy pedagogy that "shift[s] the
educational authority from . . . the experience and
knowledge of the teacher to . . . those qualities in the
student"

(NL 192).

His inspiration for students' finding

their own way is the Romantic poet W o rdsworth, who,
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Willinsky says, valued "experience and the inspirational
power of time spent reflectively alone without a teacher
except Nature"

(NL 192).

Because he reads in "Ode:

Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early
Childhood" that Wordsworth "unrestrainedly celebrates" the
child, Willinsky sees a rationale for a child-centered
writing curriculum.
The organicist's privileging of the child is not,
h o wever, the Romantic notion of the child's superiority.
Willinsky reads the Romantics as exalting childhood, and he
uses his reading of Wordsworth as an inspiration for his
students' writing.

But Wordsworth's "Intimations Ode"

looks wistfully to childhood only because of the child's
unselfconscious, unified relationship with n a t u r e .

In the

"Ode" Wordsworth's child appears among nature's b e a u t y ,
seemingly clothed in "a celestial light"

(1. 4 ) .

The poet

looks back wistfully and concludes that he no longer
possesses unity with natu r e .

This "original relation" that

the child enjoys convinces the poet that "a glory" has
passed from the e a r t h .

The verses, h o w e v e r , do not

celebrate the child but the unselfconscious state of the
child.
As in The Prelude and "Tintern A b b e y ," the ode
appraises the three stages of the speaker's separation from
natu r e :

the child, who is still connected to n a t u r e ; the

y o u t h , who daily travels "farther from the E a s t " ; and the
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Man, who "perceives it die away"

(5).

In stanza eight

Wordsworth refers to the child as the "best philosopher,"
the appellation that Willinsky uses in grounding his
process approach.

H o w e v e r , Wordsworth's characterizing the

child as having an immense soul and as being an "eye among
the blind" is indicative of his belief that the child has
what the mature poet does not have:

unity with n a t u r e .

The poet yearns for "those first affections/ Those shadowy
recollections," but he concludes that he appreciates nature
even more than he had in childhood.

The speaker appears

reconciled, but when he reveals that the most ordinary
flower that blooms gives him "thoughts that do often lie
too deep for tears," we realize the depth of his
alienation.

Willinsky reads the Romantics as idealizing

childhood, but what Wordsworth actually ponders is the loss
of his former "selfless s e l f ."

Organic Form:

Rose, Lilies, and Stones

To the organicist vital process is realized
"naturally," without outside direction or m a nipulation.
Throughout their examinations of creativity, organic
educators extol the primacy of inner t h o u g h t , intuition,
and intrinsic form.

This privileging of intrinsic over

extrinsic is what Crowley believes to be the "fundamental
opposition that entered into the inaugural gesture of
metaphysics:

inside/outside"

(12).

To the organicist
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plumbing the mystery of creativity,
preferable to "outside."

"inside” is infinitely

As hallowed as the interior

impulse toward creativity is the internal self-movement of
organic p r o c e s s .

Even though a period of "subconscious

maturation" or "long compression"

(AE 73) may precede

production, Dewey believes creativity comes with little
application of "direct effort of wit and will" and that its
form is organic, that is, "inherent, not imposed from
without"
directed,

(AE 137).

Organic creativity, then,

is inner-

is driven "below the level of intention"

(AE 73),

and realizes its structure from germination within, not
from outside mechanical imposition of structure.
In Coleridge's famous definition, organic form is
innate:
The form is mechanic when on any given material
we impress a predetermined form, not necessarily
arising out of the properties of the material, as
when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape
we wish it to retain when h a r d e n e d . The organic
form, on the other hand, is innate; it shapes as
it develops itself from within, and the fullness
of its development is one and the same with the
perfection of its outward form.
Such is the
life, such the form.
(Lectures 409)
Since he first defined creativity in genetic terms,
Coleridge's theory of organic form has had long-standing
influence in literature and criticism.

Organic form is one

of the foundational tenets of the New Criticism, and
theories of creativity— from Dewey to the present time-have incorporated its critical dicta.
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Poe told of his conscious intention in writing "The
Raven," and Wimsatt saw a poem as an "act of a self
reflexive consciousness," a conscious application of wit
and will, but the organicist cannot acknowledge intention.
De Man in "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism"
says that if one attempts to define the difference between
a stone and a chair, one must,
object,

in defining the manufactured

specify its intended use, namely, that it is

"destined to be sat on."

But a natural object like a stone

may be defined by the totality of its sensory appearances.
Thus
by asserting a p r i o r i . . . that in literary
language, the meaning is equal to the totality of
the sensory appearances [as the New Critics
asserted], one postulates in fact that the
language of literature is of the same order,
ontologically speaking, as a natural object.
The
intentional factor has been bypassed.
(24)
New Critical and organic conceptions of creativity, then,
slight conscious intention and will because,

in de Man's

interpretation, they confuse "intent," defining it as the
mental content of the p o e t 's mind.

But, says de Man,

intentionality is not something physical nor psychological,
"but structural"

(FI 25).

Though creative production is

"more complex," de Man believes that it follows this same
logic:

" [T]he intentionality of the act, far from

threatening the unity of the poetic entity, more definitely
establishes this unity"

(FI 25).

He concludes that the New
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Critics denied intentionality because it compromises their
idea of organic form (FI 28).
Knoblauch and Brannon express their aversion to a
student's being required to consider an essay
mechanistically or in parts, that is, in stages or s t e p s ,
because they believe the form of an essay should grow like
a plant; they thus deny the value of writing that assumes a
predetermined form:
When discourse is conceived in organic t e r m s , its
. . . continuity is emphasized, its integrity as
a whole, while the differentiation of parts is
regarded as the product of analytical
investigation, not as an a priori condition.
The
parts of an automobile precede the engine viewed
as a whole; but the parts of a plant, stem,
leaves, roots do not precede the plant as a
w h o l e . (85)
Knoblauch and Brannon think of a piece of writing as a
plant whose parts are not to be differentiated, as an act
without a priori analysis.

In defining the composition as

a plant, they cannot logically subscribe to an
intentionality which would refute their organic m e t a p h o r .
Intention belongs to the human being constructing the
chair, the automobile, and "The R a v e n ," not to a rose or a
lily that is "fated in the seed" to grow inevitably and
inexorably.
Dew e y 's Art as Experience is filled with allusions to
the necessity of organic form in creative production.
Knoblauch and Brannon, Dewey disavows external
organization, which is inimical to the "ordering of a

Like

growing experience . . . invol[ving]

. . . the whole of a

live creature toward a fulfilling conclusion"

(81).

Elsewhere, he says the organization of an act of expression
should not be "impelled by outside necessities," as it
often is in ordinary life, but by "an onward motion like
that of waves of the sea"

(AE 172).

He defines form as

"the operation of forces that carry the experience of an
e v e n t . object,

s c e n e . and situation to its own integral

fulfillment [original emphasis]" (AE 137).
This organic unity, Dewey suggests, exists in a poem
if the subject matter of the poem has first been
"poetically felt" in "such a unified and massive way as to
determine its own development, that is its specification
into distinctive parts [my emphasis]" (AE 192).

Should

those parts appear in the finished work as parts or "seams
and mechanical junctions," Dewey says it is "because the
substance is not controlled by a permeating quality"
192).

(AE

This quality that must appear in all the parts and

contribute to a "sense of totality" can "only be fel t " ; it
"cannot be a product of reflection"

(AE 192-94).

Even

though arduous labor might precede the final production of
a poem or d r a m a , Dewey maintains that its movement is a
"self-movement" because "prior labor" fuses freshly with a
new emotion (AE 70).

He describes this unified

organization as "dynamic . . . because it is a growth"

(AE
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Rohman and Wlecke's 1960s experimental work in
expressionistic process was founded on characteristics of
the plant.14

Like Dewey, Rohman and Wlecke stress dynamic

growth of parts, a totality of effect, and internal, rather
than external, organization.

They tell their students that

their essays "ought to be thought of as growing into an
organized whole from the dynamic encounter of the writer's
mind with his seed-idea"

(56).

The seed-idea is central to

Rohman and Wlecke's idea of process and organic unity,

for

the "single compelling insight" or seed-idea necessary to
organic form is also what drives the process

(56-58).

The

seed-idea is powerful e n o u g h , Rohman and Wlecke believe,
"to beget other ideas," which develop "inevitably" but "not
necessarily logically" into yet other ideas which have "the
p o w e r , like the plant, of assimilating . . . elements that
can be included in the total organism of the essay"

(57-

58) .
The totality that Rohman and Wlecke wish to see
demonstrated in student essays is described as "a sense of
the 'growth' of a 'seed idea' or single t h e m e ,
'exfoliation' of an argument or proof,
totality of the essay"
"growing" whole,
"finished"

(131).

(131).

'fruition'

in the

Because the whole is a

it cannot be viewed as "static" or
It is in process, becoming.

Knoblauch and Brannon,

For

"form emerges— the sense of a whole

with integrated parts or aspects"

(85).

By "form," they
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mean "a fabric," "a texture," "a continuity" but not some
"conventional shape like a paragraph"

(85).

For D e w e y , the

self-movement of a poem represents "a universe in itself"
and "a miniature w h o l e " ; the poem is "self-enclosed and
self-limiting" and has "self-sufficiency"

(AE 241).

This

miniature whole moves internally, organically, the "medium
and its meaning seem[ing] to fuse as by a preestablished
h a rmony," which Dewey attributes to the "music and euphony
of words"

(AE 242).

When educators organically define the creative
imagination, their concept does not derive from what de Man
calls "the main Romantic experience" but from Coleridge's
theories of imagination and symbolic language.
Representing the imagination and language with the capacity
to reconcile the division between writers and their acts of
expression or between the natural world and human acts of
conscious deliberation disregards Emerson's belief that
language does not have the capacity to represent reality.
And the attempt by theorists to ameliorate division by
linking a student's idea with a seed or the essay with a
plant is to pair a conscious act with an unconscious
natural image and to offer the plant as liberating when its
growth is fated and determined.

Expressionists like Rohman

and Wlecke and Willinsky and transactionalists like Berlin
and Berthoff treat the act of composing as an unfolding;
however, this kind of process theorizing fails to recognize

that writing is not organic but cognitive, an act of
reflection which is always intentional.
fruit, roses,

Images of seeds,

lilies, animals, and waves do not explain the

creative imagination but offer,

instead, mystification.

116
Notes to Chapter 4
1.
I wrote in Chapter Two of how a transactiona1ist like
Debrah Rashcke pairs Emerson with the solipsism she fears
is generated by expressionistic rhetoric and of how an
expressionist like Mark Wiley attempts to relieve the
expressionist focus on individual activity by promoting
peer groups as small communities. Though Willinsky speaks
of the process as beginning "within" (The New Literacy:
Redefining Reading and Writing in the Schools, p. 46) and
as "learning from oneself" (p. 35), he also labors to align
his expressionism with "the social situation of the
individual" (p. 55).
2.
I have already mentioned Berlin's proclivity for the
natural image; Knoblauch and Brannon's brand of
transactionalism is also framed organically. Berlin places
his own work in the epistemic transactional branch of
process; he includes, among others, Winterowd, C r o w l e y , and
Berthoff; however, though Knoblauch and Brannon claim this
same orientation, he sees them as expressionists who
understand composing as "the expression of the isolated
self" (p. 185, Rhetoric and Reality) .
3. Kronick demonstrates how Coleridge in Essays on the
Principles of Method uses allegory to explain the mind's
power for symbolizing; however, though the narrative
indicates the possibility of man's retracing "the path
leading man away from unity" (resulting in a reuniting of
language and nature), the allegory "undoes itself" when it
reveals unity left behind (pp. 64-64, American Poetics of
History;
From Emerson to the Moderns) .
4.
In Chapter Two, I noted Berlin's acquisition of
Emerson for transactional composition and his
acknowledgment of a similar expressionist claim.
Dewey
suffers from the same sort of tug-of-war:
both
transactionalists and expressionists claim him.
Berlin
says that early transactional rhetoric "was the most
complete embodiment of John Dewey's notion of progressive
education" (Rhetoric and Reality;
Writing Instruction in
American Colleges. 1900-1985. pp. 46-47).
And he finds in
Fred Newton Scott, a disciple of Emerson, a biographical,
if not a philosophical, linkage to D e w e y . According to
Berlin, Scott and Dewey were colleagues at Michigan, and
Scott taught a class in aesthetics for Dewey in the
philosophy department there (RR, p. 47; Writing Instruction
in Nineteenth-Centurv American Colleges, p. 56).
It is
apparent that Scott relished organic metaphors quite as
much as Berlin and D e w e y . In an early text Scott and
colleague Joseph Villiers Denny argue that writing should
not be thought of "as a dead form. . . but a living

117
product" and that a paragraph is like a plant "springing up
in the soil of the mind from a germinal idea" (qtd. in
Berlin, WI, p. 84).
5.
In the 1960s, Jerome Bru n e r 's emphasis on process
stimulated a renewal of process rhetoric in universities
(Berlin, RR, p. 122).
Howe v e r , it would be difficult to
distinguish how much of this revival was inspired by Bruner
or by Dewey, whose work had kept process alive in public
schools while it faded away on the college level (RR, p.
46).
Berlin admits his bias toward the transactional
(epistemic) process model (and its "Romantic," Emersonianinspired nineteenth-century manifestation in Scott's w o r k ) .
Berlin's narrative describes the attempts of David-like
process rhetorics challenging the Goliath-like currenttraditional model (the prevalent writing theory for the
past 150 y e a r s ) . He metaphorically represents the currenttraditional theory as a mechanistic, assembly-line,
product-oriented epistemology (Berlin, WI, p. 29; p. 83);
the process theories he defines in plant metap h o r s .
Berlin has told of how Scott's inaugural attempt to
launch an early (1890s) alternative to the currenttraditional philosophy failed on the college lev e l .
In the Progressive-influenced and Dewey-inspired years of
1920-1940, the popularity in public schools of both the
transactional (with its emphasis on the "social nature of
human experience") (RR, p. 58) and the expressionistic
(with its accent on individualistic self-expression)
reflected the two tributaries of Progressive education,
which Berlin says Dewey attempted to reconcile (RR, p. 59).
Dewey is, therefore, frequently cited as the precursor of
both rhetorics.
In the 1960s, with Rohman and Wlecke as revival
figures, process writing (in an expressionistic form)
reappeared in a university setting.
Other process
theorists treated in this study— Willinsky and Knoblauch
and Brannon— currently endorse some form of an
expressionistic, transactional blend of p r o c e s s .
6.
Dewey is careful in distinguishing between the
aesthetic experience of consuming— -"appreciating,
perceiving, and enjoying"— and that of actual producing—
the making of a poem or a painting (AE 47).
Still, as is
frequently the case with Dewey, he strains to effect a
reconciliation.
Though appreciation and production are
different acts, " [t]o be truly artistic, a work must also
be esthetic— that is, framed for enjoyed receptive
perception.
Constant observation is, of course, necessary
for the maker while he is producing" (AE 48).
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7.
Jose Rosario demonstrates a similar belief in Rugg,
who, he says, viewed the imagination as the "key to an
understanding of knowing and creation as basic processes
underlying the generation of all knowledge" (see "Harold
Rugg on How We Come to Know:
A View of His Aesthetics" in
Contemporary Curriculum Discourses, p. 347).
8.
Rosario credits Rugg with early recognition of the
"constraints of pragmatism" (p. 350) while simultaneously
accusing Dewey of failing "to explain what was
psychologically possible and perhaps necessary in a
creative and liberating experience" (p. 351).
Leroy
Troutner also finds Dewey's pragmatism "inadequate" in
explaining "man's subjectivity" (qtd. in Rosario, p. 351).
Even so staunch a defender of Dewey as Thomas Alexander
(John Dewev's Theory of Art. Experience & N a t u r e ) concedes
a deficiency in D e w e y 's failure to articulate the
"relationship between his description of aesthetic
experience and his instrumenta1ism" (p. 184).
Alexander,
however, argues that Dewey's theory of experience is basic
to both his instrumenta1ism and his aesthetics (p. 184).
Rugg, h o wever, (even in the posthumously published
culmination of his research on creativity, Imagination.
1963) fails to acknowledge Dewey's treatment of creativity
in Art as Experience. a study that came late in Dewey's
career (Rosario, p. 357).
9.
While Thorslev believes organicism to be the
distinguishing characteristic of Romanticism, I have argued
differently.
The retreat from consciousness that he
describes is part of the separation I have earlier
attributed to the Romantic awareness of disunity.
The
organicist, h o wever, disavows any irreparable separation in
identifying with n a t u r e .
10.
"Becoming" represents process to the organicist; to
the Romantic it represents human instability as opposed to
natu r e 's essence:
Emerson's rose i s ; human beings are
becoming. To an organicist like Dewey or Willinsky,
becoming engenders positive p r o c e s s . Willinksy adopts a
philosophy of becoming and calls it "Romantic" on the basis
of Morse Peckham's interpretation of Romanticism.
According to Willinsky, Peckham recognizes three dominant
thought patterns in Romantic literature:
a predeliction
for organic rather than mechanical metaphors, a philosophy
of becoming rather than being, and a privileging of
relationships rather than entities (qtd. in Willinsky, p.
188, The New Literacy:
Redefining Reading and Writing in
the Schools) .

119
11.
The organic educator's emphasis on knowledge gained
from experience rather than from teachers and b o o k s , as
traditionally conceived, is commonly characterized as an
element of "anti-intellectualism." Under a sub-heading
titled "Questioning Authorities and Undoing the B o o k ,"
Willinksy concedes that the New Literacy he advocates has
inherited the ”anti-intellectualism” label from the
Progressives; "the char g e ," he believes, "will always have
a toehold on a movement which challenges the authority of
the book" (The New L i t e r a c y , p. 199).
Dewey's philosophy has borne this label more than any
other educator's.
See Richard Hofstadter's
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1962) and Morton
White's essay of that same year, "Reflections on AntiIntellectualism. " D e w e y 's influence is implied in White's
treatment, but Hofstadter devotes over fifty pages to Dewey
and what he considers to be his negative impact on American
education.
When both studies were printed in 1962, about
five years after Sputnik, American education was being
criticized for its failure to teach hard science and logic
— central concerns of the pure rationalist— at a time when
the country appeared inclined toward rationalism as a
"necessary" educational base.
Though Dewey does not refer to specific matters of
curricula praxis in Art as Experience, his references to
the wrong use of teachers and books are numerous and
widespread throughout his work.
For example, in How We
Think (1910), Dewey praises the common man "with little
schooling" because of his success in practical affairs (p.
120); twenty-eight years later, he reiterates this
sentiment in Experience and Education when he calls the
educational deficit of the common man with "little
schooling" a "positive asset" because the man has common
sense and has learned from his experiences (p. 48).
Dewey believes a student who attempts to memorize a
"simulated cut-and-dried copy of the logic of an adult"
will find his own logical processes stultified (HWT, pp.
79-80) and a student tied to a book will become a "parasite
living on the secondhand experience of others (HWT, pp. 7980).
Boo k s , he says, are "the chief representatives of the
lore and wisdom of the past (EE, pp. 18-19).
In both
Democracy and Education and How We T h i n k , he finds b o o k s ,
as traditional education uses them, negatives, rejecting
"bookishness" (DE, p. 232) and advising students to avoid
the "paths already trodden in the book" (HWT, p. 264).
12.
Though rarer, unity achieved by mature persons is,
Dewey believes, "on a deeper level and with a fuller
content of meaning" (AE 72).
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13.
Throughout The New Lite r a c y . Willinsky confronts the
old Progressive tension between focusing on individual
self-expression or on the communal and social.
He is an
expressionist in his writing philosophy.
However, as an
organicist, he feels an attraction for the organic whole.
Organicists often place emphasis on "collectivism rather
than on individualism" (Thorslev, Romantic Contr a r i e s , p.
90) .
14.
Rohman and Wlecke structure their pre-writing
experiment on M. H. Abrams's five characteristics of plant
life as it differs from mechanical systems.
Abrams's
characteristics evolve out of his analysis of Coleridge's
"founding image" of "the distinction between the root
analogies of machine and growing plant" (p. 170, The Mirror
and the La m p ) .

CHAPTER 5
OTHERNESS IN INTERPRETATION:

TRIADIC DIALOGUE

An organic reading pedagogy, such as that recommended
by John Willinsky,

looks upon literature as an occasion for

confirming and consolidating identity:

the self seeks and

discovers in the mirrored representation of literature
sameness.

This discovery should, then, according to an

organicist like Willinsky, be shared with a community of
readers; reading,

in this model, becomes an implement of

organic connection— of self with self and of self with
others.

What I propose as an alternative to this

organicism is a model derived from Felman's reading of
Lacan— one which promotes not sameness and mirrored
reflection but difference.

This Lacanian model is triadic

rather than dyadic in its configuration of t e a c h e r ,
student, and Otherness.

In the discourse driven by this

triad, student and teacher discover neither self-knowledge
nor self-confirmation but difference:

the discovery of

unconscious knowledge, the discovery of what they did not
know they knew.
While Willinsky moves the teacher to the periphery and
defines his or her role as that of inspirational leader,
the teacher in the Lacanian model is part of a
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configuration which features no center but which attempts
to access new knowledge denied to our conscious discourse.
While Willinsky believes that critical judgments derive
from emotional responses to literature and that students
should not engage in an analysis of what he calls the
"artifact," a Lacanian pedagogy would insist on the
impossibility of subjective interpretation and would
require that students closely examine the text in their
active production of meaning.
Willinsky7s model for teaching literature parallels
the organicism of his writing pedagogy.

But perhaps even

more than in his model of expressionist writing,
Willinsky7s teacher becomes an insubstantial, almost
apparitional,
classroom.

figure assigned to the periphery of the

Because he wishes an autonomous reader to

derive his or her own meaning from a literary work rather
than having it furnished by a teacher, he advocates
"reading without teachers"

(NL 85).1

His philosophical

base is reader-response criticism, specifically readerresponse theory as defined by David Bleich.2

From this

reader-oriented pedagogy, Willinsky promotes reading that
offers "pleasure,

insight, and self-exploration"

"engagement and self-expression"

(NL 94),

(NL 72),

"a means of

learning more about the world . . . outside of and within
the student"

(NL 97), and an occasion for "a deep level of
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engagement as well as expression of personal meaning"

(NL

105) .
Most of all, Willinsky believes reading should achieve
"associations of self and community"

(NL 108)— associations

that result in what might be identified as the gist of
Willinsky's organicist reading philosophy:

connection.

He

sees "education in literature becom[ing] an association
among texts and readers" and argues that "in this way,
response becomes connection"
literature, he believes,

(NL 107).

An education in

"makes bold strides toward the

classic humanist call of 'only connect,' and it makes them
through this essential connection"

(NL 107).

In short, Willinsky's design advances the idea of
students' engaging texts in search of personal meaning,
self-exploration, and self-expression, with the ultimate
goal being the organic integration of individual selves
with the larger community.

His reading theory assumes both

the transparency of language and a centered subj e c t ; in
arguing thus, he fails to acknowledge how language limits
and defines the subjects he treats as autonomous.

Speaking

of the kind of intersubj ective communication and centered
subject that Willinsky envisions, Catherine Belsey has
said:
. . . the form of the classic realist text acts
in conjunction with the expressive theory and
with ideology by interpellating the reader as
subj e c t . . . . This model of intersubj ective
communication, of shared understanding of a text
which re-presents the world, is the guarantee not
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only of the truth of the text but of the reader's
existence as an autonomous and knowing subject in
a world of knowing subjects.
In this way classic
realism constitutes an ideological practice in
addressing itself to readers as subjects,
interpellating them in order that they freely
accept their subjectivity and their subjection.
(68-69)
As an alternative to the organicism Willinsky
proposes,

I suggest Shoshana Felman's Lacanian reading

model, an asymmetrical model which differs from the
traditional dyadic configuration by insinuating a third
point— Otherness— representing a means of accessing the
unconscious knowledge of both student and t e a c h e r .

Using

Freud and Lacan, Felman argues that a reading model built
on the psychoanalytic relationship of analyst, analysand,
and the unconscious— a triadic conf iguration of teacher,
student, and Otherness— moves pedagogy from "the
transmission of ready-made knowledge" to the "creation of a
new condition of knowledge, the creation of an original
learning disposition"

(JL 81).

With the addition of

Otherness, both the teacher and the student gain access to
knowledge outside themselves, that is, to knowledge outside
their conscious knowledge and outside the duality of their
relationship.

Felman's pedagogy thus dispenses with the

dualism Willinsky opposes but to which he can offer little
other than a metaphysical notion of connection.

Addressing

the binary oppositions which organicist educators
repetitively, and metaphysically,

ask language and
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imagination to reconcile, Felman explains how a model of
asymmetrical reflexivity eliminates these dualisms:
By shifting and undercutting the clear-cut
polarities between subject and object, self and
other, inside and outside, analyst and analysand,
consciousness and the unconscious, the new
Freudian reflexivity substitutes for all
traditional binary symmetrical conceptual
oppositions— that is, substitutes for the very
foundations of Western metaphysics— a new mode of
interfering heterogeneity. (Felman JL 61)
Willinsky's reading model is caught up in the teacherstudent or student-text dualisms which he reconciles with
suggestions of merging and connecting; Felman, h o w e v e r ,
"shifts and undercuts" these polarities with an Otherness,
an "interfering heterogeneity," that works to bring
unconscious thoughts of both student and teacher to
conscious discourse.

In an analytic reading model, the

t e acher's position is neither central

(there is no center

in this centerless model) nor peripheral because the
triadic exchange eliminates centers.

The t e a c h e r , then,

like the student and the Otherness of the unconscious,
occupies a position in the triad.
Organicists align students with plants, curriculum
with flowering, and ideas with seeds, all the while
insisting on their homogeneity.

Felman's Lacanian m o d e l ,

h o wever, insists not on identity but on difference, on
Otherness.

What a model attentive to Otherness brings to

consciousness is something different,

something the teacher

and student do not identity with but recognize as something

126
other-— something they never knew they knew.

Gregory Jay

says Otherness results when the teacher "brings unconscious
defenses, desires into the realm of discourse . . . .
Students then may discover how what they don't know that
they think prevents them from knowing or thinking something
else"

(790).

What Jay suggests is that thinking contains

an element of ignorance or blindness.

In a model

recognizing Otherness, the aim of pedagogy becomes that of
revealing how ignorance— what students don't know that they
think— prevents their learning something else.

A model

like Willinsky's does not recognize how ignorance can teach
because it is self-grounded:

reading is self-reflection,

a

vehicle for self-exploration, even self-confirmation.
Inasmuch as Willinsky's pedagogy sanctions the essential,
centered self of students, it cannot offer them what Felman
urges— an "original learning disposition"

(JL 81).

An organic, reader-centered interpretive framework
views learning as an organic,

linear unfolding.

But

Felman's psychoanalytic pedagogy moves on "breakthroughs,
leaps, discontinuities, regressions, and deferred action"
and raises doubts about the kind of organic wholism
Willinsky imagines:
. . . the unconscious, in Lacan's conception, is
precisely the discovery that human discourse can
by definition never be entirely in agreement with
itself, entirely identical to its knowledge of
itself, since, as the vehicle of unconscious
knowledge, it is constitutively the material
locus of a signifying difference from itself.
(Felman, JL 77)
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Felman's theory moves interpretation from self-reflection,
which, she reminds us,

is always a symmetrical and mirrored

reflection, to an asymmetrical, "revolving reflexivity":
triadic, rather than dyadic, conf iguration.

a

Felman's

addition of Otherness not only eliminates what Willinsky
fears— the reading teacher as dispenser of meaning— but,
more powerfully, argues that literature is more than a
substance to be dispensed.

Inasmuch as "textual knowledge"

is "knowledge of the functioning of language . . .
knowledge at once derived from— and directed toward—
interpretation," Felman argues that it cannot be "acquired
(or possessed)

once and for all"

(JL 81).

She draws a

parallel between the analytic and pedagogical structures.
The analyst, she maintains, has only textual knowledge that
offers no "ready-made interpretation" in any specific
patient's case:
While the analysand is obviously ignorant of his
own unconscious, the analyst is doubly ignorant:
pedagogically ignorant of his suspended (given)
knowledge; actually ignorant of the very
knowledge the analysand presumes him to possess
of his own (the analysand's) unconscious:
knowledge of the very knowledge h e — the patient—
lacks.
(JL 82)
It is from the patient's speech, which "says much more than
it k n o w s , that the analyst will come to learn the patient's
own unconscious knowledge. that knowledge which is
inaccessible to itself.

. . [original emphasis]" (JL 82).

Felman contrasts this psychoanalytic structure with
the dialogic structure of the traditional classroom:

in
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this conventional arrangement the teacher's question is
answered by the other (the student)
way.

in a totally "expected"

But Lacan argues that the "true O t h e r . . . is the

Other who gives the answer one does not expect"
Felman, JL 82).

(qtd. in

The answer that is not expected— what

Felman calls "new knowledge previously denied to
consciousness"

(JL 76)— is "that which comes as a surprise,

that which is constitutively the return of a difference [my
emphasis]" (JL 82).

Felman explains how this new

knowledge, which offers difference coming as a surprise,
must come from an O t h e r .

An organic conception of reading

recognizes only the ego, not the unconscious.
Robert Con Davis has contrasted Lacan's use of the
early Freud with the later, or American, F r e u d :

in the

earlier Freud preferred by L a c a n , "the center of
functioning . . .

is not the ego but the unconscious"; in

the American Freud the ego is the center,

"a substantial

t h i n g , the actual self of the person [original emphasis]"
(751).

Willinsky's model looks to reading as self

expansion, offering greater engagement, exploration, and
expression of the essential selves of reading stude n t s .
Traditional pedagogy, such as that represented by the
organicism of Willinsky, believes, as does American ego
psychology,
673) .

in "the illusion of individual autonomy"

(McGee
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The Lacanian Freud followed by Felman stresses,
however, what Davis calls "positioning.11

Pedagogy is,

Davis says, a
science of positioning, of understanding a
student's relation to a dominant discourse, a
discourse the student is constituted by as well
as has an effect on. . . . a discourse [which]
itself is unconscious [original emphasis]. (752)
What Davis calls "positioning," Felman refers to as "a
process that gives access to new knowledge previously
denied to consciousness [my emphasis]" (JL 76).

Teaching,

then, becomes "the creation of a new condition of
knowledge, the creation of an original learning disposition
[my emphasis]"

(Felman JL 80-81).

With "positioning" and

"the creation of an original learning disposition,"
Felman's paradigm moves interpretation in literature from
Willinsky's appeal for seeking a personal connection with a
work to a discovery not of self (of either student or
teacher)

but of the Otherness in each.

Willinsky's interpretive pedagogy lacks positioning,
for he sees literature as a project of the reader's
connecting the experience of the author with his or her own
"personal history"

(NL 106-07); students exit the course

with much of what they brought in, never questioning their
centered positions nor their relation to larger discourses
that actually define them.

They leave without questioning

the reality of an "autonomy" that a pedagogy like
Willinsky's promises them.

They fail to discern what is
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actually an "illusion":

the subject fails "to see beyond

the illusion of autonomy to the implication of the subject
in cultural processes"

(McGee 671).

Instead,

students

remain in an illusory center without access to "an original
learning disposition."

The Unconscious and Otherness
What does Felman mean by "Otherness," the third
position in her model of triadic dialogue?

Otherness does

not issue from Willinsky's illusion of personal autonomy,
nor does it emerge from what Felman refers to as the
"traditional pedagogical dynamic," that is, from the
teacher's conventional questioning of the student or from
the student's request for information.

Answers returned by

both student and teacher in these traditional,

symmetrical

roles call for information and closure; answers to
questions traditionally posed are, says Felman,

"expected"

(JL 82), thus incapable of offering a return of the
unexpected— the return of a difference or of "new
knowledge."

This is the mirrored,

symmetrical duality that

Felman distinguishes as essentially narcissistic

(JL 126).

Otherness is not a part of this traditional
pedagogical structure.

Instead, Otherness develops out of

• • • a discourse that is o t h e r . or excentric. to the discourse of the s e l f . It is, in
effect, a discourse that is other to itself, not
in possession of itself; a discourse that no
consciousness can master and that no speaking
subject can assume or own.
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The unconscious is a discourse that is
radically intersubjective. Since it is a
discourse that no consciousness can own, the only
way a consciousness can hear it is as coming from
the Other [original emphasis] . . . . (123)
If the discourse of the Other is "not in possession of
itself" and is a discourse "no consciousness can o w n ," then
the Willinsky model, built on a "personal response"

(NL

103) to literature and "on meaning that arises within
readers"

(NL 106), is essentially self-reflective.

Willinsky's organic reading model assumes the subject's
presence and the similarity of self and its representation
in language.

Derrida has spoken of the unconscious as

. . . differed— which no doubt means that it is
woven out of differences, but also that it sends
out, that is delegates, representatives, or
p r oxies; but there is no chance that the
mandating subj ect "exists" somewhere, that it is
present or is "itself," still less that it will
become conscious. . . . This radical alterity,
removed from every possible mode of presence, is
characterized by irreducible aftereffects, by
delayed effects.
(Speech 152)
These "representatives," "proxies," "aftereffects," or
"delayed effects" are what Otherness represents; they
manifest themselves in "unmeant knowledge that escapes
intentiona1ity" (Felman, JL 77),

in d r e a m s , in jok e s , in

slips of the tongue and pen (Belsey 131; Felman 22).

This

"unmeant knowledge" is not readily available through a
pedagogy that fosters self-reflection.

Freud speaks of

this knowledge that "escapes intentionality":
. . . A part of the activity of your own mind has
been withdrawn from your knowledge and from the
command of your will. . . you are using one part
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of your force to fight the other part. . . A
great deal more must constantly be going on in
your mind than can be known to your
consciousness.
Come, let yourself be taught,
(qtd. in Felman, JL 75)
Felman sees in this explanation a pedagogical occasion,

for

Freud speaks of a part of the mind being unavailable to
another part:

it is "thus that psychoanalysis has sought

to educate the ego," to offer access to "new knowledge"
(JL 76).
Lacan uses the Freudian discovery of the unconscious
to explain how a human subject, through induction into
language,

learns to "relate symbolically to other

signifiers . . . to other humans and to articulate his own
desire, his own unconscious, unawares"

(Felman, JL 115).

Lacan says that the unconscious is born at the moment the
child acquires language (enters the symbolic o r d e r ) .
According to Lacan, the child at first does not realize its
own identity, but during the "Imaginary or mirror phase,"
it gains a dual perspective (of self and othe r ) .

Belsey

maintains this "'recognition' is an identification with an
'imaginary'

(because imaged) unitary and autonomous self"

(60); this mirrored reflection represents both harmony and
alienation to the child:

its specular image represents

wholeness, yet the "I which is perceived and the I which
does the perceiving"

(Belsey 64) also demonstrate division.

When the child enters the symbolic phase, represented by
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the father who stands for the law and the restriction
against incest, the child hears its
first author itat ive "no," the first imperative of
renunciation, inaugurating, through this
castration of the child's original desire, both
the necessity of repression and the process of
symbolic substitution of objects of desire, which
Lacan calls "the Symbolic."
(Felman, JL 104)
The child must deal with both desire and the law regulating
desire "through a linguistic structure of exch a n g e ."
Repeatedly, the child must replace and substitute symbolic
objects as substitutes of desire (JL 104).
Belsey says the Symbolic division reinforces the
alienation of the mirror or Imaginary p h a s e :

"There is

thus a contradiction between the conscious self, the self
which appears in its own discourse,

and the self which is

only partly represented t h e r e , the self which speaks"
65).

(64-

As a result,
The unconscious comes into being in the gap which
is formed by this division.
The unconscious is
constructed in the moment of entry into the
symbolic o r d e r , simultaneously with the
construction of the subject.
The repository of
repressed and pre-linguistic signifiers, the
unconscious is a constant source of potential
disruption of the symbolic o r d e r . (Belsey 65)

The child not only gains access to the "possibility of
social relations" with its newly discovered language
abilities,
wishes

it also is able to voice its own needs and

(Belsey 65).

However, Belsey explains that " . . .

at the same time a division within the self is constructed"
because language "cannot by definition formulate those
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elements of desire which remain unconscious"; the subject
thus becomes the "site of contradiction"

(65)-—

contradiction that manifests itself in what Derrida has
called "aftereffects" and what Felman has designated as
"unmeant knowledge" that "escapes intentionality"
Unconscious desire, then,

"once repressed,

(JL 77).

survives in

displaced symbolic media that govern the subject's life and
actions without his ever being aware of their meaning
..."

(Felman, JL 41)— -unconscious desire that comes to be

"exposed" in language (JL 43).

Felman associates what a

subject does not remember "with repression, with the
imperative to forget-— the imperative . . . not to admit to
knowledge"

(JL 79).

Ignorance thus becomes "no longer

simply opposed to knowledge:

it is itself a very radical

condition, an integral part of the very structure of
knowledge"

(Felman, JL 78); ignorance, Felman insists,

is

"not a passive state of absence, a simple lack of
information" but "an active refusal of information" and
thus a "desire to ignore."
Felman,

And teaching, according to

"has to deal not so much with lack of knowledge as

with resistances to knowledge"

(JL 79).

F r e u d 's great

"discovery," she believes, was "in showing the ways in
which ignorance can teach us something, become itself
instructive"

(JL 79).

Barbara Johnson uses Socrates'

words— "Most people are unaware that they do not know the
true nature of the things they discuss"— and his avowal— "I
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know only that I am ignorant"

(qtd. in "Teaching" 181)— to

make the point that what we usually think of as knowledge
"is really an array of received ideas, prejudices, and
opinions-— a way of not knowing that one does not know
[original emphasis]" ("Teaching" 180).
An analytically informed reading p e d a g o g y , then, would
focus interpretation on making ignorance informative, would
examine the gaps and inconsistencies in t e x t s , and would
ask these questions;

"Where does a text . . . precisely

make no sense, that is, resist interpretation?

Where does

what I see and what I read resist my understanding?"
(Felman, JL 80).

Jay argues that a literature class may

serve as "the occasion for [the] articulation" of these
resistances:

"what we resist knowing is intricately tied

to our constitution as social subjects.

It is this

structure of resistance that the student already 'knows'
yet still needs to 'learn'. . ." (789).
What constitutes this repression, these unconscious
desires?

Though Felman states that the Oedipal question is

central to analysis,

she stresses that the question is "not

necessarily" one "addressing analysands' desire for
parents" but "a question addressing analysands'
misapprehension, misrecognition . . . of their own history"
(JL 129):
The subject's question in no way refers to the
results of any specific weaning, abandonment, or
vital lack of love or affection; it concerns the
subject's history inasmuch as the subject
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misapprehends,
misrecoanizes. it [original
emphasis] . . . .
(JL 129)
Willinsky insists that students should find their own
personal meaning in what they read, but Felman says
that what can be read (and perhaps what should be
read) is not just meaning but the lack of
meaning; that significance lies not just in
consciousness, but specifically, in its
disruption . . . that the lack of meaning— the
discontinuity in conscious understanding— can and
should be interpreted as such, without
necessarily being transformed into meaning.
(JL
45)
Not only does Willinsky believe that students should search
for "personal meaning" and the "sense of a t e x t 's meaning"
which "arises inside readers"

(NL 106), he believes that

they should do so in a virtually "teacherless" a t mosphere.
Felman, on the other hand, maintains that the unconscious
cannot be accessed by one alone:

the discourse of the

unconscious is "radically intersubjective" and accessible
only by "coming from the Other"

(JL 1 2 3 ) .3

While the

position of the Other in psychoanalytic dialogue is
occupied by both the analyst and the unconscious of both
patient and analyst, this position, pedagogically, would be
occupied by the teacher and by the unconscious of both
student and teacher (the Other representing the bringing to
conscious dialogue of the unconscious thoughts of e a c h ) .
What Lacan has seen as "only apparently two-way"

(qtd. in

Felman 126) in the analytic dialogue should be "only
apparently" dual in a reading p e d a g o g y . In Felman's theory
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of reading, a "revolving reflexivity" emerges from the
dynamic of teacher,

student, and Otherness.

The Subject
In Willinsky's model, the subjective response of an
autonomous reader is directed to a community of others
where it is, theoretically, shared and works to connect
reader and community.

How e v e r , his reader's autonomy and

freedom emerge from the duality of self-reflection (self
reflecting self) and from the dualism of a self he sees as
merging with community.

Any unity recognized by Willinsky

as originating from these dualities is, h o w e v e r ,
metaphysica1l y , not genuinely, realized.

An organic theory

of interpretation fails to acknowledge language and the
discursive inscription of subjects (in Willinsky's ironic
phrase)

in "their place in the scheme of things"

(NL 108).

In his eagerness for connection, Willinsky ignores the
implication of language and its role in producing the
social, political, and economic positions we occupy in the
"scheme of things":

ironically, he says,

"...

[R]eaders

need to see how that reading connects not just with
themselves, but with their place in the scheme of things"
(NL 108).

In fact,

language works with ideology to

inscribe us in the scheme of things, but Willinsky's own
reading model is oblivious to the implication of language
in this inscription.
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Derrida has said that the subject "is inscribed in the
language, that he is a 'function' of the language"
Belsey 59).

(qtd. in

Speaking of the "oppositional relation" of the

metaphysical notion of "self-identity" to "otherness,"
Derrida believes that the "other, as the other than self,
the other that opposes self-identity,

is not something that

can be detected . . . with the aid of a philosophical lamp"
(Interview, Kearney 117-18).

H o w e v e r , reading literature

"as language" will allow us, says Derrida,

"to interrogate

the covert philosophical and political presuppositions of
institutionalized critical methods which generally govern
our reading of a text"

(original emphasis)

(Interview,

Kearney 125).
But Willinsky's organic reading model ignores the
close textual analysis required to examine language and the
critical methods that guide and determine our thinking.

In

fact, Willinsky's theory stresses "the literary experience"
of reader and text "rather than an analysis of the
artifact"

(NL 95).

Inasmuch as his organicist philosophy

predisposes him to search for identity and similarity,
Willinsky's reading theory overlooks the difference and
Otherness in language.

Belsey has said that " [w]ithin the

existing ideology it appears "obvious" that people are
autonomous individuals, possessed of subjectivity or
consciousness which is the "source of their beliefs and
actions"; it is what she says Althusser specifies as "the
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elementary ideological effect"

(58).

In Willinsky's

"teacherless" reading model, the idea of student autonomy
is what he assumes to be natural and obvious;
. . . the autonomy of the student is encouraged
. . . . the principal thing about reading is that
you are to read for yourself, for the sense which
books can make of, or add to, your own experience
and understanding, which you then have a
responsibi1ity to share with o t h e r s . (85)
Willinsky's repeated appeals for students to read for
"personal meaning" and for students to connect a text with
their "personal history" attest to his succumbing to the
"elementary ideological effect."

Both Derrida's view of

language as a means of calling to question the ways
critical schools govern our reading of literature and
Belsey's reminder of how existing ideology promotes the
idea of an autonomous subj ect point to the ingenuousness of
Willinsky's assumptions about language, reading, and the
read e r .

"The Subject Presumed to Know"
It is, in other w o r d s , as of the moment the
student recognizes that learning has no t e r m ,
that he can himself become a tea c h e r , assume the
position of teacher. But the position of the
teacher is itself the position of the one who
learns, of the one who teaches nothing other than
the way he learns [original emphasis]. (Felman,
JL 88)
What Felman emphasizes about an analytically informed
reading pedagogy is both the interminable apprenticeship of
learners— student and teacher— and the dynamic nature of
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the "revolving reflexivity" of the triad of student,
teacher, and the unconscious— its dynamism driven by the
shifting and revolving of the learning and teaching roles
of teacher and student.

Although both Felman and Willinsky

propose the elimination of the authoritative teacher, their
rejection of authority results in very different proposals.
Felman's literature teacher presumes no mastery; she or he,
in fact,

is "one who learns."

Using Lacan's own teaching

as an example, Felman tells of his efforts "to learn from
the students his own knowledge"

(JL 83); this, Felman

suggests, may be accomplished in the classroom through
accessing Otherness.

Knowledge is not o w n e d , and mastery

is, says Felman, an "illusion," "a mirage"

(83-84).

The primary deterrent to the interminable
apprenticeship which Felman conceives is transference, the
student's identification with the "subject presumed to
know"

(JL 84).

With transference, the student is relieved

"of any responsibility for the production or effects of
knowledge"

(Jay 785).

He or she reflects

(mirrors) what

the teacher desires; the relationship b e c o m e s , argues Jay,
"a relationship of identification instead of analysis," one
which "fixes the positions of knowledge rather than
questioning their assumptions or displacing their
privileges"

(785).

For Willinsky the chief obstacle to student autonomy
is the authoritative teacher, though he posits that texts

141
and literary critics also imperil autonomy.

Willinsky

suggests equipping students with reader-response techniques
to replace teacher-dominated interpretation of t e x t s .

He

believes his "New Literacy" formula best exemplified in
David Bleich's idea of a reader-response oriented classroom
(NL 105).

He especially admires Bleich's practice of

writing his own responses to a text at the same time that
his students write theirs.

Thus the teacher b e c o m e s , in

Willinsky's attempt to abolish authority, a "source of
inspiration [my emphasis]" (NL 106):

she or he functions

in a modeling role.
H o wever, Willinsky's attempt at establishing an
egalitarian atmosphere with teachers as sources of
inspiration provides an occasion for the transference
Felman believes detrimental to education.

Lacan says,

"As

soon as there is somewhere a subject presumed to know,
there is transference"

(qtd. in JL 85).

Because Lacan has

defined transference to be "the acting-out of the reality
of the unconscious"

(JL 85-86), Felman believes teaching is

not a "purely cognitive,

informative experience . . . [but]

also an emotional experience"

(JL 86).

According to Lacan,

transference is "love directed t o w a r d , addressed to,
knowledge"

(qtd. in JL 86).

Though Willinsky theoretically

moves the literature teacher to the margins of the
classroom, he speaks of the teacher as a source of
inspiration, and thus, potentially, the recipient of "love

directed toward, addressed to knowledge,"

Gregory Jay

maintains that a "teacher . . . must take up the position
of authority in order to displace it, and thus to teach the
student how to doubt Mastery"

(789).4

Willinsky praises

Bleich's practice of sitting among his students, modeling
responsive writing for them, and serving as a source of
inspiration.

But in no part of his interpretation of

Bleich nor in the explanation of his own theories does
Willinsky address preparing students to "doubt Mastery," to
focus on the language of the text, or to examine what
Belsey calls "the unspoken in the text"

(138).

Bleich's

student "'knows' by virtue Of identification with the
position of the teacher as the subject who k n o w s ," and when
this h a ppens, Jay states,
productive sense"

"then there is no knowing in any

(789) .

Lacanian Interpretation
A reading pedagogy following the Lacanian model
Shoshana Felman has described would emphasize a number of
practices which Willinsky's organicism ignores or treats
very differently.

Analytic interpretation would insist on

a close examination of t e x t s , would orient the student
toward production rather than consumption of meaning, would
attempt to develop genuinely critical reading habits in
students, and would emphasize what is obsc u r e , unreadable,
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and contradictory in texts instead of stressing a text's
meaningfulness and organic unity.
After rejecting reader-response theorist Stanley
Fish's "Model Reader" or "super reader" and Louise
Rosenblatt's reader-response theories for slighting the
" 'social' function of literature"

(NL 102), Willinsky

recommends Bleich's subjective variety of reader-response
criticism in which the reader takes "ownership" of "new
knowledge," re-creates his or her original feelings when
reading the text and bonds to the work, and, finally,
"brings the work into [his or her] history"

(NL 105).

According to Willinsky, Bleich believes that "critical
judgements are implicit in emotional reactions"

(qtd. in NL

105), that finding "personal meaning" is essential,
that intersubjectivity ("thought collective")

and

results from

"recognizing the community . . . in which individual
readings take place . . . "

(NL 107).

In Willinsky's view

Bleich's reader-response model values "emotional reactions"
and personal responses to a text rather than a New Critical
search for a single, definitive reading.
Willinsky thus sees in Bleich and other readerresponse theorists "the undoing of the New Criticism"
95) .5

(NL

However, Belsey, Jonathan Loesberg, and Jane

Tompkins have all pointed out that the two critical schools
hold some basically identical v i e w s .6

Willinksy rejects

Fish's "Model" or "super" reader because he believes "the

New Literacy has a need for a reader-response grounded in
the practices of mortal readers"

(NL 98).

Calling Fish's

reader-response "a sophisticated form of New Criticism,"
Belsey concludes that reader-response interpretation has
become "the literary equivalent of populism, challenging
the privilege of the author but offering instead the
reader's intuition as a new source of authority"

(34).

No

characterization of Willinsky's vision of the reader seems
more appropriate than the description Belsey has drawn of
"reader-power."

Both his desire that readers find

personal meaning in texts and his endorsement of Bleich's
belief that critical judgments issue from emotional
reactions to texts establish in his theory the primacy of
reader intuition.

This valuing of student intuition—

coupled with his attempts to remove the authoritative
teacher from the environment of the reader— b e c o m e s , in
Belsey's w o r d s , "the literary equivalent of populism."
In Willinsky's pedagogy, reading is "self
exploration, " the "principal thing about reading" being the
idea "that you are to read for yourself,

for the sense

which books can make of, or add to, your own experience and
understanding . . . "

(NL 85).

" [m]eaning is not personal.

Derrida, h o w e v e r , says that
It does not depend on the

subjective identity but on the field of different forces,
the conflict of forces, which produces interpretations"
(Interview, Kearns 21).

Belsey has pointed out that the
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meanings of a single sentence "vary from one political
discourse to another . . . and to the extent that the
hearer participates in these political discourses, he or
she finds in the sentence one or more possible meanings"
(53).

But, Belsey argues, these varied interpretations are

not subjective readings:
To posit an individual subject as an authority
for a single meaning is to ignore the degree to
which subjectivity itself is a discursive
construction. To find a guarantee of meaning in
the world or in experience is to ignore the fact
that our experience of the world is itself
articulated in language. (53)
Felman's Lacanian theory of reading would concentrate
on the "field of forces" that Derrida refers to, focusing
on what Willinsky derisively calls "an analysis of the
artifact"

(NL 95) "by scrutinizing the words on the page

harder than the New Criticism ever had . . ." (Felperin
255). A Lacanian reading pedagogy would not regard words as
"translucent" and autonomous, nor would it strain to find
"the organic unity that binds together irony, paradox,
ambiguity in a privileged . . . language . . . "
255-56).

Instead,

it would disseminate,

(Felperin

in the words

Felman uses to describe de Man's teaching,
suspicion"

and

"a lesson of

("Postal" 54).

De Man himself has described the kind of close reading
which would be reguired in what he calls rhetorical
criticism.
class,

In "The Return to Philology," de Man tells of a

"The Interpretation of Literature," taught in the
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1950s at Harvard University by Reuben Brower.

He reveals

how Brower focused interpretation "on the way meaning is
conveyed rather than on the meaning itself"
(23).

He characterizes Brower's insistence on close

reading as "an entirely innocuous and pragmatic precept"
which resulted in the transformation of students:
Students, as they began to write on the writings
of others , were not to say anything that was not
derived from the text they were considering.
They were not to make any statements that they
could not support by a specific use of language
that actually occurred in the text.
They were
asked, in other w o r d s , to begin bv reading texts
closely as texts and not to move at once into the
general context of human experience or history,
(my emphasis) (RP 23)
Brower's students, in other w o r d s , were interpreting
literature by paying close attention "to the philological
and rhetorical devices of language," which, de Man
concludes,

"is not the same as aesthetic appreciation

. . ." (RP 24) .
Willinsky's r e a d e r s , howe v e r , are urged to connect
their reading with their life experiences and to "see how
literature and life go together"

(NL 113).

In requiring

close reading of the text, both de Man and Felman deny the
interpretive value of an aesthetic response.

Felman says,

To read is then to read, specifically, the
difference between life and language. The
necessity of reading stems from the discrepancy
between thought and life, between act and
understanding, between the urge for freedom and
the bondage in which language keeps us.
Reading
is an attempt to cancel this discrepancy, to set
ourselves free of the signifying chain— of our
entrapment in linguistic structures, to catch up
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with, and cancel out, the foolishness unwittingly
exhibited by living [original e mphasis].
("Postal” 55)
De Man contends that close reading can be "deeply
subversive" because it "respond[s] to structures of
language which it is the more or less secret aim of
literary teaching to keep h i d d e n " ; this close attention to
"the philological and rhetorical devices of language is not
the same as aesthetic appreciation . . . "

(RP 24).

Ho wever, Willinsky contends that emotional responses
to literature culminate in critical judgments and argues
that "students should experience the text in an aesthetic
manner . . . [original emphasis]" (NL 103).

Indicating

that aesthetics derives from "philosophers of nature and of
the self rather than [from] philosophers of language," de
Man concludes that
[i]t is because we teach literature as an
aesthetic function that we can move so easily
from literature to its apparent prolongations in
the spheres of self-knowledge, of religion, and
of politics.
(RP 25)
Literature,

in de Man's view, should be taught "as a

rhetoric and a poetics," its justification being not the
dispersing of "cultural excellence" but the cultivation of
a "principle of disbelief"

(RP 25).

A Lacanian reading model which insures the triadic
relationship of student, teacher, and Otherness would
concentrate not on the similarities and connections
organicists strain to effect but on difference, on

148
Otherness.

While Willinsky appears to recognize gaps and

inconsistencies in t e x t s , he offers an organicist's r e m e d y :
We cannot thoroughly render or articulate the
experience of reading; we can only sketch out
parts piecemeal with perhaps a little imaginative
fillincr-in for what goes m i s s i n g . (my emphasis)
(NL 98)
This urge to "fill in," to smooth over, to pull toge t h e r ,
and to connect characterizes organicist philosophy.
Barbara Johnson, h o w e v e r , says that a text should not be
"read solely in function of intentionality, meaningfulness,
and representativity" but that what readers have
"traditionally been trained to disregard, overcome, explain
away, or edit out-— contradictions, obscurities,
ambiguities,

incoherences, discontinuities, ellipses,

interruptions, repetitions, and plays of the signifier"— ■
should become the very objects of interpretation
("Rigorous" 74).

Nonetheless, Willinsky prescribes

"imaginative filling-in for what goes missing."
Traditional pedagogy emphasizes self-reflection and
dialogue.

H o wever, Felman demonstrates that self

reflection is a kind of mirroring narcissism that cannot
encompass that which is Other to the s e l f .

Since this

Otherness is not available to us in self-reflection,

Felman

repeatedly refers to the "radically intersubjective" nature
required of a pedagogy sensitive to accessing "new
knowledge."

What is needed, Felman maintains,

mode of reflexivity-—

is a new
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the process through which something turns back
upon itself:
a new mode of reflexivity that
necessarily incorporates a passage through the
O t h e r , not as a reflection of the self but as a
radical difference from the self . . . .
(JL 60)
The self which returns is different from its former s e l f ;
ignorance, then, has become "structurally informative,

in

an asymmetrically reflexive dialogue in which the
interlocutors— through language— inform each other of what
they do not know"

(JL 60).

An organicist like Willinsky regards the reader as
autonomous and centered, and he calls for students to see
how reading connects them with the world and their place in
the world.

But Derrida and Belsey have shown that the

subject is inscribed in language:

"subjectivity itself is

a discursive construction . . . [and] our experience of the
world is itself articulated in language"

(Belsey 53).

To

insure student autonomy, Willinsky envisions the tea c h e r 's
role to be that of inspirational leader.

This

"teacherless" structure, however, does not guarantee
autonomy,

for Felman demonstrates that transference— an

identification with the "subject presumed to know"-— thwarts
autonomy.
Reading, then, should introduce Otherness to students,
the experiencing of that which is outside the self.

A

postmodern theory of interpretation would also encourage
close reading of t e x t s , the student's active production of
meaning, the incorporation of genuinely critical reading

habits, and a search not for unity but for seams,
junctures, obscurities, ambiguities, and contradictions in
tex t s .
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Notes to Chapter 5
1.
Willinsky acknowledges his use of Peter Elbow's wellknown description of "writing without teachers" (The New
L i teracy, p. 85).
2.
Willinsky dismisses Stanley Fish's immense influence
in reader-response theory, saying that the New Literacy
focuses on "real readers" and "mortal readers" rather than
on the "model" or "super reader" of Fish.
What he appears
to avoid is Fish's insistence on close r e a d i n g . Willinsky
argues that actual readers are "too busily engaged" in
reading to practice this close reading.
See The New
Literacy, p. 98.
3.
Felman quotes Lacan as specifying that the unconscious
is "transindividua1" and "not at the disposal of the
subject." Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insi g h t , p.
126.
4.
Jasper Neel says the idea of teacher as "medium" or
"unscrambling device" is a "scary idea" but that " . . .
anyone who enters a high school classroom has assumed it—
willy-nilly, ready or n o t ."
Neel believes high school
teachers "literally define the reading process for most
Americans, who, throughout their adult lives, will continue
to 'receive' what they read through the scrambling device
they were given in school" (p. 63, "Writing about
Literature (or Country H a m ) ").
5.
Willinsky finds New Critics Wimsatt and Beardsley's
explanation of the "affective fallacy" especially offensive
because he believes that the effect a work of literature
has on a reader is of primary significance.
6.
Tompkins has spoken of how both New Critics and
reader-response theorists "assume that to specify meaning
is criticism's ultimate goal" (qtd. in Loesberg 23).
Loesberg links reader-response methods with intentionalism,
saying that in attempting "to locate where and how specific
meanings are produced, one will turn either to authors or
to readers, either intention or response . . . "
(p. 22,
"Intentionalism, Reader-Response and the Place of
Deconstruction). Belsey thinks "a kind of implicit
intentionalism" (p. 16) survived in the New Criticism while
the New Critical emphasis on a single meaning remains a
part of the interpretive communities of reader-response
criticism (p. 29).
See Belsey's Critical P r a c t i c e .

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Much of what has been called "Romantic" in twentiethcentury American education is actually organic.

While the

Romantic poets and philosophers of the nineteenth century
employed organic metaphors to express their longing for
unity, another voice— a dominant voice— told of the reality
of their separation and alienation.

In labeling pedagogy

as "Romantic," educators follow a very traditional reading
of the Romantics, one fostered by literary historians and
the New Criticism.

The Romantics recognized consciousness

or language as the origin of their separation:

language

allowed them to think the difference between nature and
human beings.

Unselfconscious nature lacks temporal

awareness, but the Romantics repeatedly demonstrated their
own recognition of time and mortality.
This Romantic recognition and the revisionist readings
of the 1960s and 1970s which first identified alienation as
the primary Romantic experience have been entirely
overlooked by educators who cling to old definitions and
traditional conceptions of Romanticism.
were, according to de Man,
have put into question,

The Romantics

"the first modern writers to

in the language of poetry, the

ontological priority of the sensory object"
152

(IS 16); they
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are, however, still being regarded by American education as
nature worshipers who reconcile the division between nature
and humankind.
It is, however , educators who insist on identification
with n a t u r e - i d e n t i f y i n g desirable reform with natural
living t h ings.

They pair student thinking with seed

germination, the developing essay with the growth of the
plant, and the movement of creative process with the onward
motion of sea w a v e s .

They metaphorically identify their

reform proposals with nature and life while simultaneously
coupling the status quo with the machine and d e a t h .

Their

organic metaphors reveal an ontological urge inasmuch as
their use of the natural image, "the expression most apt to
gain our immediate acquiescence," reflects their attempts
'•to draw closer and closer to the ontological status of the
object . . . " (de Man, IS 7).

In employing natural

images, they link their reform with eternal life, with
organic nature which is atemporal and unaware of death; the
tradition they wish to eradicate, then, becomes d e a t h , the
force opposing their living reforms.
Emerson is the Romantic whose thinking has most
dominated American education.

As do other e ducators, Dewey

reads Emerson as the great unifier, a reconciler of subject
and object, an advocate of continuity and integration.
D e wey's interpretation of the transparent eyeball passage
in Nature defines an organic Emerson, who surrenders to
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"ecstatic communion," an act which Dewey believes
illustrates the "natural continuity" between human beings
and nature (AE 28-29).

Perhaps the reading most typical of

the way Emerson is misread by educators is Grant's
interpretation of the roses in "Self-Reliance."

Grant

believes the roses indicative of Emerson's belief that
humankind and nature are unified; h o w e v e r , in the rose
passage Emerson laments the disunity of humanity and
nature, for the rose lives above time while human beings
are bound by time.
Emerson knew that language could not bridge the gap
between subject and object, that language,

in fact, created

the gap (Kronick 61); but Dewey subscribed to a symbolic
theory of language:

words are instruments of communication

which can be easily used and understood by communities of
language users.

Especially is Emerson's philosophy

appropriated by organicist rhetoricians.

Two schools of

process theorists— expressionists and transactionalists—
consider Emerson's philosophy (as well as Dewey's)
foundational.

Theorists such as Willinsky, Berlin, Wiley,

Berthoff, Rohman and Wlecke, and Knoblauch and Brannon
identify composing with the natural growth of a plant.
When Dewey defined his aesthetics, he too endorsed internal
organization and organic form:

the poem would determine

its own movement, "meaning and medium fusing as by a
preestablished harmony"

(AE 242).

Creativity,

then,
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becomes with organicist theorists an act of unfolding and
not an act of conscious reflection.
What organicists disregard is language.

They view

language and the imagination as implements of mediation.
Metaphysica1l y , they assume language conne c t s .
in their view,

is communication:

result, they argue,

Lang u a g e ,

writing and reading

in shared meaning.

recognize is difference or O therness.

What they do not
In literature,

Willinsky asks students to interpret on the basis of their
emotional and personal responses to a text— responses
which, when shared with a community of r e a d e r s , will
connect the individual with the larger community.

His is a

reading theory of connection and integration, a theory
which fails to incorporate any idea of language and its
significance in constituting subjectivity.

Shoshana

Felman's proposal of a dialogic triad of stud e n t , teacher,
and Otherness, h o w e v e r , breaks down the mirroring,
dualistic association of teacher and student and introduces
the unconscious as an access route to new k n o w l e d g e .
The organicists' insistence on connection, wholism,
and unity is established through m e t a p h o r , but these
educators "fail to realize that the very fact that the
relationship has to be established within the medium of
language indicates that it does not exist in actuality” (de
Man IS 8).

J. Hillis Miller tells of how the conclusion of

Wutherina Heights leaves readers unsatisfied at the "state
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of unappeased desire"; therefore, critics have attempted to
"explain" the novel, to smooth over the difficulties,
to close the text in a definitive fashion.

and

Miller says

that the metaphoric language used to describe the
"satisfying state of unity for which Cathy and Heathcliffe
yearn" is "by its very nature the thing that makes such
unity impossible"

(67-68).

Education suffers from a

similar desire to explain disunity, to smooth over the
difficulties.

Language, however— even green images of

plants or blooming roses or waves of the sea— cannot make
two one.

Miller says:
. . . the intuition of an original state of unity
. . . . is a projection outward of a oneness, a
unity which never was nor could be, from the
state of twoness within.
This duality is within
the self, within the relation of the self to
another, within society, and within language.
The sense that there must at some time have been
an original state of unity is generated by the
state of division itself as a haunting insight,
always at the corner or at the blind center of
vision, where sight fails . . . . "it" exists
only in language. It exists in the experience of
things as traces of something absent, something
that never was or could be present.
(68)
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